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1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the distinct characteristics of ad hoc networks, which 
make them very difficult to secure. Such characteristics include: the lack of network 
infrastructure; no pre-existing relationships; unreliable multi-hop communication channels; 
resource limitation; and node mobility. We provided a theoretical background to mobile ad 
hoc networks and the security issues that are related to such networks. We defined the ad 
hoc networks and their characteristics in terms of trust establishment.  As the focus of the 
two chapters is on the network layer, attacks specific to this layer are identified and 
explained in Chapter 1. We also presented a survey of the existing key management 
solutions for mobile ad hoc networks. 
The current chapter is a continuation for the previous one. This is why we start this chapter 
by Section-2 that offers a survey of the existing secure routing protocols for mobile ad hoc 
networks. This section makes a pertinent observation that most secure routing protocols 
assume some kind of key management authority exists. Mobile ad hoc networks have little 
fixed network architecture and it is unlikely that there is a centralised authority member.  
Section-2 of this chapter together with last section of the previous one identify the problem 
that the two chapters together are addressing. There exists secure routing mechanisms to 
address the unique characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks, however, these solutions 
assume that key management is addressed prior to network establishment. A novel, on-
demand solution to the key management problem for mobile ad hoc networks is then 
described.  Section-3 details the functionality and operation of the proposed model: “Direct 
Indirect Trust Distribution” (DITD). The DITD model focuses on the task of distributing 
keying information.  The DITD model also includes a verification optimization protocol and 
trust evaluation metric, which maximises the security of distribution. 
The implementation and simulation of the DITD model is examined in Section-4.  There are 
various packages used to compare existing and proposed routing protocols. One such 
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package is the ns2 Network Simulator, which is commonly used in the relating literature. A 
comparative ns2 simulation study between the DITD and the AODV protocols is presented.  
The DITD model is based on the Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing 
protocol. Simulations show the performance overhead of including key management 
functionality and the performance of DITD in the presence of malicious attacking nodes. 
Section-5 summarises the contribution of the Chapter to the field of trust establishment in 
mobile ad hoc networks. Section-5 also provides future direction for research. 
2. Secure routing in mobile ad hoc networks 
A mobile ad hoc network’s routing protocol has unique challenges due to the dynamic 
nature of ad hoc network.  Mobile ad hoc networks do not have the same privileges that 
fixed, wired networks have. The routing mechanisms are uniquely designed to deal with the 
lack of infrastructure and unreliable wireless multi-hop communication channels. 
This section investigates the procedure of securing of these routing protocols.  The routing 
solutions are briefly visited and an extensive survey is presented for the existing security 
mechanisms that are used to secure these routing protocols. 
Routing in mobile ad hoc networks is divided into two categories: table driven methods and 
on-demand methods.  Table driven methods are also known as proactive routing.  They 
maintain routing tables that contain routes to all the nodes in the network.  Theses tables are 
periodically updated which allows routing information to be available at all times.  
Examples of table methods include Destination Sequence Distance Vector Routing (DSDV) 
[Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994] and Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR).  Source initiated on-
demand routing methods establishes routes in a reactive manner.  Routes are established 
through a route discovery phase.  During a route discovery phase node S will broadcast a 
request message RREQ into the network.  This request message is forwarded until it reaches 
its target destination node D. Node D then replies with a reply message RREP which is 
unicast along the reverse route, until it reaches the source and the route is established.  
Routes are maintained as long as they are required.  Examples of on-demand methods 
include Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) [Perkins et al, 2003] and Dynamic 
Source Routing protocol (DSR) [Johnson et al, 2001].  The reactive on-demand approach is 
less computationally expensive, in comparison with the proactive table driven approach. 
In the previous chapter, it is identified that most security attacks target the network layer, 
and more specifically the routing protocol. These attacks include: black-hole attacks; 
wormhole attacks; eavesdropping attacks; byzantine attacks; resource consumption attacks; 
and routing table poisoning.  The routing protocol is found on the network layer and is a 
significant service for mobile ad hoc network.  Adversaries, specifically, target the routing 
protocol. Thus, a secure routing solution is needed for ad hoc networks to be securely 
implemented. 
This section gives a survey and an analysis of the existing secure routing protocols.  Each 
protocol is presented and investigated based on: functionality; operational assumptions; and 
security.  A summary and discussion is formulated at the close of this section. 
2.1 Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD) 
Secure efficient ad hoc distance vector (SEAD) [Hu et al, 2002] is a secure routing protocol 
which is used in conjunction with the table driven destination-sequenced distance vector 
(DSDV) routing protocol [Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994].  The DSDV routing protocol uses a 
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distributed version of the Bellman-Ford algorithm to discover the shortest path between two 
nodes.  The SEAD protocol uses symmetric key cryptography and one-way hash functions 
to protect against security attacks like denial of service and resource attacks. 
a. System Overview  
The DSDV routing protocol discovers the shortest path based on a route’s hop count.  
Routing packets are assigned sequence numbers to ensure the most recent route is 
processed.  The hop count and sequence number variables are stored in the routing packets.  
Attackers can create an incorrect routing state in nodes resulting in a denial of service attack 
(DoS) where the attacker attempts to make other nodes consume excess bandwidth and 
processing time.  SEAD makes the routing process robust against multiple uncoordinated 
attackers by authenticating the hop count and sequence number of routing packets with a 
one-way hash function h.  Hash chaining is used so that only nodes that are in possession of 
the previous routing update (identified by a sequence number) can broadcast a new routing 
update.  Authenticated routing updates are computed to prevent against malicious routing 
updates broadcast by attackers.  
b. One-Way Hash Function 
SEAD uses a one-way hash function to authenticate routing updates and minimize resource 
consumption attacks. A formal definition of the hash function H is provided in [Stalling, 
2003]. The most commonly used hash functions are MD-5 [Rivest, 1992] and SHA-1 
[Publications F IPS, 2008]. 
A one-way hash function H is used to generate a one-way hash chain h.  The one-way hash 
function H has an input of any bit length * and outputs a variable of fixed bit length p.  The 
one-way hash function H must be computationally impossible to invert. 茎┺ 岫ど┸な岻茅 蝦 岫ど┸な岻椎 
A hash chain hi is created when a node selects a random number x樺 岫ど┸な岻椎 and uses it to 
generate a list of variable which make up a hash chain h0, h1, h2, h3, …, hn.  Here h0 = x and hi 
is calculated using the irreversible one-way hash function H such that: 月沈 噺 茎岫月沈貸怠岻  where ど 判 件 判 券 
Assuming there is an existing authenticated element, a node can verify elements later in the 
chain’s sequence.  For example if an authenticated element hi exists, a node can authenticate 
hi-4 by checking that hi = H(H(H(H(hi-4)))).  SEAD assumes the existence of an authentication 
and key distribution mechanism to distribute an authenticated element like hn allowing for 
authentication by hash chaining [Hu et al, 2002].   
c. Authenticating routing updates 
SEAD uses the elements of the hash chain to provide authentication and secure the routing 
updates in DSDV.  SEAD assumes an upper bound on the variable to be authenticated, for 
example if it were the hop count then SEAD would assume a maximum route distance n in 
the network (the maximum hop count between two nodes allowed).  This also eliminates 
any routes with a length greater than m to exist, eliminating possible routing loops or the 
routing infinite problem. 
The sequence values that make up the hash chain are calculated from the H function such 
that h1, h2, …, hn where n is divisible by m.  For a routing table entry with sequence number i 
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let 倦 噺 券 兼エ 伐 件. An element from hkm, hkm+1, …, hkm+m-1 is used to authenticate the routing 
entry with sequence number i.  If the hop count is j where"ど 判 倹 隼 兼, then hkm+j is used to 
authenticate the routing entry found with sequence number i and hop count j [Hu et al, 
2002]. 
Routing updates are sent with the appropriate routing information and a hash chain value is 
used to authenticate the update. If the authentication value appended is hkm+j then only 
attackers with hkm+j-1 can modify the authentication value. Nodes receiving a routing update, 
check the authentication value hkm+j by calculating the new hash chain value.  Receiving 
nodes can calculate the new hash chain value by using the earlier hash chain value hkm+j-1 
and the received sequence number i and hop count j. If the new calculated hash value is 
equal to hkm+j then the routing update is verified. 
SEAD proposes two methods for routing update authentication. One method uses clock 
synchronization and a broadcast authentication mechanism like TESLA [Perrig et al, 2001].  
The second method requires a shared secret between each communicating node pair.  The 
secret can be used to implement a message authentication code (MAC) between nodes 
authenticating routing update messages. 
d. Analysis 
The SEAD protocol protects the ad hoc network from routing attacks that target resource 
consumption. The SEAD protocol does protect against multiple uncooperative attacks, 
preventing routing loops but routing loop prevention cannot be guaranteed in the presence 
of co-operating attackers.  The SEAD protocol is vulnerable to intelligent attackers that use 
the same sequence number and same hop count of the most recent update to corrupt routing 
information. The SEAD protocol provides protection against denial of service attacks [Perrig 
et al, 2001], replay attacks and routing table poisoning by authenticating routing updates so 
malicious nodes cannot corrupt the routing procedure.      
2.2 A secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks (Ariadne) 
Ariadne [Hu et al, 2005] is a secure on-demand routing protocol which uses symmetric 
cryptography. Ariadne is based on the on-demand DSR [Johnson et al, 2001] routing 
protocol and is developed by the same authors as the SEAD protocol [Hu et al, 2002].  
Ariadne provides end-to-end authentication on the routing layer. 
a. System Overview       
Ariadne assumes a shared secret key between communicating node pairs and uses message 
authentication code (MAC) to authenticate end-to-end packets between the communication 
pair.  Broadcast authentication is employed, with loose time synchronization, to authenticate 
route request and other broadcast packets. The TESLA [Perrig et al, 2001] broadcast 
authentication scheme is used.  In TESLA the source generates a one-way key chain and a 
schedule is made which defines at which time keys of the chain are revealed.  This 
mechanism limits Ardiadne’s operation to ad hoc networks which have time 
synchronization. Ardiane provides end-to-end authentication in an on-demand manner over 
the DSR routing protocol [Hu et al, 2005].  
b. End-to-end Authentication 
For communication from a source node S to a destination node D, the source S will 
broadcast a route request into the network and expect a reply from D.  Ariadne assumes a 
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shared secret between S and D, KSD and KDS, which enables message authentication for each 
respective direction. 
Nodes S wanting to start a route discovery for node D will first generate an initial hash 
chain h0 consisting of: a packet identifier identifying the type of packet (a request packet 
RREQ in this case); the source’s address (IDS); the destinations address (IDD); a broadcast 
identity (bi) identifying the current route discovery; and a TESLA time interval (tes) 
identifying the expected time of arrival at the destination. 月待 噺 警畦系懲縄呑岫迎迎継芸】荊経聴】荊経帖】決件】建結嫌岻 
 Node S will broadcast a route request packet which includes: a packet identifier, the hash 
chain h0; the source’s address (IDS); the destinations address (IDD); the broadcast identity 
(bi); the TESLA time interval (tes); a node list N() and a MAC list M().  The packet broadcast 
is as follows: 鯨 蝦 決堅剣欠穴潔欠嫌建" 柑 ""迎迎継芸】月待】荊経聴】荊経帖】決件】建結嫌】軽岫岻】警岫岻 
A neighbouring node that receives the route request checks the validity of the TESLA time 
interval, tes.  The TESLA time interval is valid if the corresponding key that it points to has 
not been revealed yet and the time interval does not point too far in the future.  The 
neighbouring node A will then compute a new hash chain h1 using the previous hash chain 
h0.  A message authentication code of the packet to be broadcast is created (MACA).  MACA is 
calculated using the TESLA key (KAtes). Before forwarding the packet the neighbour node A 
includes: the hash chain h1; itself in the node list N; and the MACA calculated in the MAC list 
M.  The hash function and broadcast packet are as follows: 月怠 噺 茎岫畦】月待岻 畦 蝦 決堅剣欠穴潔欠嫌建" 柑 ""迎迎継芸】月怠】荊経聴】荊経帖】決件】建結嫌】軽岫畦岻】警岫警畦系凋岻 
Intermediate node P receiving a forwarded route request first calculates a new message 
authentication code MACP and a new hash chain  月沈 噺 茎岫鶏 伐 な】月沈貸怠岻 where P-1 is the 
previous node and hi-1 is the previous hash chain value. Secondly it includes this 
information and forwards the route request as follows: 鶏 蝦 決堅剣欠穴潔欠嫌建" 柑 ""迎迎継芸】月沈】荊経聴】荊経帖】決件】建結嫌】軽岫畦┸┼ ┸ 鶏岻】警岫警畦系凋┸ ┼ ┸警畦系牒岻 
The route request is propagated to the destination node D.  When D receives the route 
request it validates the authenticity of the route request by checking that the TESLA time 
intervals indicate no keys have been released as of yet and that the hash chain is valid.  D 
then generates a message authentication code MACD.  MACD and an empty key list K() are 
included in the packet and sent back along the reverse path indicated by the node list and 
DSR protocol.  The MACD and reply message are as follows: 警畦系帖 噺 警畦系懲呑縄岫迎迎継鶏】荊経帖】荊経聴】決件】建結嫌】軽岫┼ 岻】┸警岫┼ 岻 経 蝦 鶏" 柑 ""迎迎継鶏】荊経帖】荊経聴】決件】建結嫌】軽岫┼ 岻】警岫┼ 岻】警畦系帖】計岫岻 
Intermediate node that receive a reply message will wait for the tes time interval to lapse so 
the corresponding key can be revealed an included in the key list K().  The reply message is 
forwarded until it contains all the TESLA keys of the intermediate nodes and it finally 
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reaches the source node S. The source then verifies the validity of all the keys, MACD, and 
the message authentication code contains. 
c. Maintenance 
Ariadne achieves secure route maintenance by authenticating the DSR error messages.  
Ariadne authenticates error messages preventing malicious nodes from broadcasting false 
broken links and causing denial of service type attacks.  When an error message is generated 
TESLA authentication information is included.  If authentication is delayed as a result of the 
TESLA time intervals, the intermediate nodes buffer the error message until the appropriate 
keys are revealed and the message can be authenticated and action taken [Hu et al, 2005].    
d. Analysis 
The authors of Ariadne are the same authors of SEAD [Hu et al, 2002] protocol. Ariadne 
employs an end-to-end approach to authentication while SEAD uses a hop-by-hop approach 
because of the DSDV routing procedure.  The Ariadne proposal is based on the on-demand 
DSR routing protocol. Ariadne implements TESLA broadcast authentication and message 
authentication code to provide authentication for routing packets in an ad hoc network 
environment.  The Ariadne proposal assumes that there exists some shared secret between a 
communication pair, therefore assuming the existence of an authentication and key 
distribution mechanism. Ariadne relies on TESLA authentication which requires time 
synchronization in the ad hoc network, synchronization is difficult to achieve without the 
presence of an outside authorized member or TTP. 
Ariadne implements end-to-end authentication to prevent unauthorized nodes from 
sending error messages and incorrect routing packets in the form of repays attacks.  
However this proposal does not consider the case where attackers do not cooperate with the 
routing protocol and drop routing packets which are suppose to be forwarded. An extension 
is proposed in [Hu et al, 2003] which uses packet leashing to solve this problem.                   
2.3 Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks 
The authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN) protocol [Sanzgiri et al, 2002] is a 
securing routing solution which uses cryptographic certificates. ARAN is designed for an 
on-demand ad hoc routing protocol and achieves authentication, integrity and non-
repudiation on the network layer but assumes prior shared secrets at initialization. 
a. System Overview 
The ARAN secure routing protocol establishes trust in three stages: 
1. Issuing of certificates 
2. Route Discover process 
3. Shortest path Optimization 
Initially ARAN assumes the presence of a trusted third party (TTP) which issues valid 
certificates, and a shared public key for all participating nodes.  The route discovery process 
of ARAN provides end-to-end authentication for communicating nodes.  The source node 
broadcasts a route request which carries the source’s certificate. The route request is 
propagated to the destination node by an end-to-end authentication process. The destination 
node responds by unicasting a reply message back along the found route using the end–to-
end authentication protocol. 
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b. Issuing of Certificates 
This section describes how the certificates are issued and distributed to the participating 
nodes.  The assumption is made that an authenticated trusted third party (TTP) member 
exists which plays the roles of an initial certificate authority (CA).  This TTP CA is known to 
all the nodes in the network.  The ARAN protocol assumes that certificates are generated by 
the TTP CA and distributed to nodes before they officially join the wireless ad hoc network.  
No specific key distribution mechanism is described for the ARAN protocol. Node i entering 
the network will receive a certificate certi from the TTP CA that has the following contents: 劇劇鶏 伐 系畦 蝦 件"" 柑 """ 潔結堅建沈 噺 継賃畷畷鍋貼頓豚岫荊経沈】計沈】建】結建岻 
The certificate certi is signed by the private key of the TTP-CA (kCA-TTP) and has the following 
contents: IDi representing the identification of node i for example a specific IP address; Ki 
the public key of node i; t the timestamp for the certi; and et the expiry time of the certificate. 
c. Route Discovery Process 
The route discovery process provides end-to-end authentication which ensures that the 
packets sent from a source node S reach their intended destination node D.  Each node 
maintains a routing table which contains the active communication routes between the 
different source and destination pairs. The route discovery process begins by a source S 
broadcasting a route request.  The route request is signed by the source node’s private key kS 
and contains: the certificate of the source node (certS); the identification of the destination 
node (IDD); a nonce (NS); a timestamp (t); and a packet identifier identifying that the packet 
is a route request packet (RREQ).  The authenticated route request broadcast by node S is: 鯨 蝦 決堅剣欠穴潔欠嫌建"" 柑 """ 継賃縄岫潔結堅建聴】荊経帖】軽聴】建】迎迎継芸岻 
The nonce value is incremented every time the source sends a route request. The nonce 
value acts like a sequence number ensuring the most recent route request is dealt with.  Each 
node that receives the route request will process it if it has a higher value of the source’s 
nonce than previously received route requests from the same source node. Each 
intermediate node P receiving the route request will validate the signature with the 
certificate, update the routing table with the neighbour from whom it received the route 
request, sign the route request and broadcast it to its neighbours. Node P will remove the 
signature and certificate of the previous node if the previous node was not the source itself.  
Therefore each forwarded route request is authenticated by the source and the 
intermediated node and will contain two certificates certS and certP: 鶏 蝦 決堅剣欠穴潔欠嫌建"" 柑 """ 潔結堅建牒】継賃鍋岫継賃縄岫潔結堅建聴】荊経帖】軽聴】建】迎迎継芸岻 
The route request is propagated to the destination node D which will reply with a reply 
message RREP.  The reply packet is signed by the destination node’s private key kD and the 
packet contains: the identity of the source node (IDS); the destination’s certificate (certD); a 
nonce of validity (ND); a timestamp (t); and a packet identifier (RREP).  The reply packet is 
unicast along the reverse path toward the source node with a similar authentication 
procedure to the forwarding of the route request. 経 蝦 堅結懸結堅嫌結"喧欠建月"" 柑 """ 継賃呑岫潔結堅建帖】荊経聴】軽帖】建】迎迎継鶏岻 
519
li i il
i i
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design 520 鶏 蝦 堅結懸結堅嫌結"喧欠建月"" 柑 """ 潔結堅建牒】継賃鍋岫継賃呑岫潔結堅建帖】荊経聴】軽帖】建】迎迎継鶏岻 
The source node will receive the reply packet RREP and check the signature and nonce (ND) 
to verify that the packet was sent by the destination node and not a malicious attacker.  If 
the nonce or certificate fails an error message is broadcast and the route request process 
restarted. 
d. Shortest Path Confirmation 
This is an optional procedure employed by ARAN to ensure that the shortest path is found 
between source and destination.  Path confirmation has a high computational cost. After a 
route has been found between S and D the shortest path confirmation process begins.  The 
source will broadcast a packet signed by the public key of D (KD) containing: the certificate 
of the source; the identity of the destination node; a nonce (NS); timestamp (t); and packet 
identifier identifying that this is a shortest path confirmation packet (SPC). 鯨 蝦 決堅欠剣穴潔欠嫌建"" 柑 """ 継懲呑岫潔結堅建聴】荊経帖】軽聴】建】鯨鶏系岻 
Each intermediate node that receive the SPC packet updates its routing table, signs the 
packet, includes its certificate and signs it with the public key of the destination node. 鶏な 蝦 決堅欠剣穴潔欠嫌建"" 柑 """ 継計経岫潔結堅建鶏な】継倦鶏な岫継計経盤潔結堅建鯨】荊経経】軽鯨】建】鯨鶏系匪 
The destination node will verify all the signatures and reply to the first and subsequent SPC 
packets with a recorded shortest path packet RSP. The RSP is propagated to the source 
which confirms the shortest path by verifying the nonce NS sent with the SPC packet. 
e. Maintenance 
The ARAN solution uses error messages and implicit revocation of certificates to maintain 
routes. Error message packets (ERR) are broadcast by any node P that discovers a broken 
route. An ERR packet is signed by its originator and includes the certificate of the originator, 
the source and destination pair describing the broken route, a nonce, a timestamp, and a 
packet identifier. Each node receiving an ERR packet will check its routing table if it 
contains the accused route.  If it does then the ERR packet is rebroadcast unchanged. 鶏 蝦 決堅欠剣穴潔欠嫌建"" 柑 """ 継賃鍋岫潔結堅建牒】荊経聴】荊経帖】軽牒】建】継迎迎岻 
The expiration (et) attribute included in each certificate allows for implicit revocation of 
certificates. Certificates are implicitly checked during the route discovery process.  Explicit 
revocation is achieved by the TTP CA broadcasting a certificate revocation message to nodes 
which then can forward it.  Routes are re-calculated as a result of certificate revocation. 
Analysis 
The ARAN solution uses asymmetric key cryptography to provide authentication, integrity 
and non-reputation. Asymmetric cryptography will result in high complexity and 
computational cost. A trusted certificate authority (TTP CA) is required so that 
authentication can be made available.  In the route discovery process unlike AODV, ARAN 
disallows intermediate nodes which have a path to the destination to reply with a RREP 
message.  This creates addition routing overheads but ensures authentication [Sanzgiri et al, 
2002]. 
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2.4 Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SAODV) 
Zapata et al [Zapata, 2002] proposes the Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(SAODV) protocol as a security extension to the AODV protocol. SAODV secures the AODV 
protocol by using a hybrid cryptographic approach involving asymmetric cryptography in 
the form of digital signatures and symmetric cryptography in the form of hash chains.    
a. System Overview 
SAODV defines the fields in a routing packet into two categories mutable and non-mutable.  
The non-mutable fields are authenticated using asymmetric cryptographic signatures.  The 
only mutable field in an AODV routing packet is the hop count. A new hash chain is created 
for each route discovery phase which is used to secure the hop count.  SAODV requires that 
the AODV routing packet is extended to include the security information like digital 
certificates.  The implementation of digital signatures and hash chains provides end-to-end 
authentication for the AODV routing protocol.   
SAODV uses asymmetric cryptography and assumes the presence of a key management 
scheme to distribute keys in a secure manner [Zapata, 2002]. It also assumes that it is 
possible to verify the relationship between a public key and an IP address or identity.  
b. Packet Extension 
SAODV proposes an extension to the standard AODV message format so that security 
mechanism can be implemented.  The SAODV extension contains the following fields as 
described in Table - 1 and Figure 1 [Zapata, 2002]. 
The standard AODV protocol uses packet sizes of 512 bytes but the SAODV extension 
requires the AODV packet size to be extended to use packets of size 1024 bytes.  
c. Route Discovery Process 
A source node S initiates a route request to a destination node D by performing the 
following steps: 
 
Field Description 
Type This is a packet identifier where the value 64 identifies a request 
packet RREQ and the value 65 identifies a reply packet RREP. 
Length The length of the packet data. 
Hash Function This describes the hash function used for example MD5 [Rivest, 
1992] or SHA-1 [Publications F IPS, 208]. 
Max Hop Count The maximum hop count (mhc) is used for hop count 
authentication. It defines the maximum number of nodes a packet is 
allowed to pass through. 
Top Hash The top hash is the result of the hash function H applied mhc times 
to a random generated number x such that: top hash = Hmhc(x).  Top 
Hash is vital in the hop count authentication process. 
Signature This field is 32-bit aligned and contains the signature used to 
authenticate all the non-mutable fields in the AODV packet. 
Hash This field is 32-bit aligned and contains the hash value hi used to 
authenticate the mutable hop count variable. 
Table 1. RREQ and RREP Signature Extension Fields 
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Fig. 1. RREQ Single Signature Extension 
1. S sets the max hop count (mhc) variable equal to the TTL (time to live) variable found in 
the IP header. 
2. S generates a random number x and sets it as the value in the hash field such that h0 = x. 
3. The top hash is then generated by applying the hash function H, max hop count (mdc) 
times to h0 such that: top hash= hmhc = Hmhc(h0).  The hash function H is defined in the 
hash function field in the packet header.   
4. S digitally signs all the fields in the packet except hop count and hash field and stores 
the digital signature in the 32-bit signature field. 
5. S then broadcasts the route request packet to its neighbours. 
When an intermediate node receives a route request it verifies the authenticity of the hop 
count and the integrity of the digital signature. The digital signature is verified using 
asymmetric cryptography.  The hop count is verified by checking hmhc = Hmhc-i(hi), where hmhc 
is the top hash; hi is the hash field of the route request; and Hmhc-i is the application of the 
hash function max hop count minus the hop count (i) times. The one-way hash chain 
approach used to authenticate the hop-count is similar to the approach used in the SEAD 
protocol [Hu et al, 2002].  After the intermediate node verifies the digital signature and hop 
count, it replaces the packet’s hash field with a new hash value computed by applying the 
hash function to the existing hash value.  The intermediate node then rebroadcasts the route 
request and propagates it until it reaches the destination D. 
When the route request RREQ reaches the destination D, D checks the validity of the packet 
and will reply with a reply packet RREP if the route request is valid.  The RREP packet is 
forward along the reverse route to the source following the same authentication and 
integrity procedure that the RREQ message experienced.    
AODV allows for intermediate nodes to also reply to route requests if they have a valid 
route to the destination node.  SAODV proposes two solutions to this security problem. 
The first is the simplest disallowing intermediate nodes to reply ensuring that the 
destination node sends the reply message RREP and guaranteeing authentication.  The 
second approach uses a double signature extension which allows an intermediate node P 
to reply to a route request from S for D RREQSD.  Intermediate node P will reply with a 
double signature RREP message. One signature will sign the intermediate node P’s 
standard reply and the second signature will sign the original RREP packet received by P 
for its route to D.  Both reply message headers are included and sent to the source S to 
establish a secure route to D. 
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d. Maintenance 
AODV uses error messages RERR to report broken links.  SAODV secures these messages 
using digital signatures.  The originator of the error message signs the entire message except 
the destination sequence number.  Each forwarding node also signs the message to prevent 
unauthorized error messages being broadcast.  Nodes using SAODV do not change their 
destination sequence number after receiving an error message because the error message’s 
sequence number is not authenticated.     
Analysis 
SAODV authenticates the AODV routing packets preventing certain impersonation attacks.  
The assumption is made that a node’s identity and address can be securely bound to a 
public key.  Such an assumption leaves SAODV vulnerable to Sybil attacks.  
SAODV employs asymmetric cryptography which is computationally taxing. The packet 
size has to be extended to incorporate the security mechanism resulting in a serve 
communication overhead. For every route discovery a new one-way hash chain is computed 
resulting in further computational overheads. 
The SAODV protocol assumes a key management entity is available in the ad hoc network 
which can successfully distribute public keys among participants. Such infrastructure is 
difficult to execute in mobile ad hoc networks and before SAODV is to be implemented 
either an off-line TTP or distributive key management scheme must be employed. 
The SAODV solution uses hash chaining and digital signatures providing security against 
impersonation routing attacks.  It also helps toward preventing denial of service attacks and 
eavesdropping attacks where malicious users may re-direct a route through a malicious 
node where eavesdropping may occur. 
2.5 Secure Link-State routing (SLSP) 
A hybrid scheme is proposed in [Perrig et al, 2001] called Secure Link State Routing Protocol 
(SLSP). It is a proactive security solution which uses digital signatures and one-way hash 
chains to provide security to link-state updates and neighbour discovery.  SLSP secures link 
state information in localized manner and can operate alone or be combined with a reactive 
ad hoc protocol routing protocol like ZRP where SLSP would be the intra-zone routing 
protocol for the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [Haas & Pearlman, 2001].  
a. System Overview 
SLSP provides secure neighbour discovery for nodes in a limited hop radius called a zone.  
Link state updates are authenticated using a hybrid cryptographic method and flooding 
attacks prevented by a priority ranking mechanism. The main assumption of SLSP is that 
nodes have existing asymmetric key pairs.  SLSP assumes that a key management scheme is 
present to certify the public keys in the network. 
SLSP uses four components: key distribution, secure neighbour discovery, link state update 
management, and a priority ranking scheme. SLSP’s priority ranking scheme prevents 
denial of service type attacks. 
b. Key distribution 
SLSP assumes that each node has an existing signed public key before it joins the network; 
and the certification of keys is performed by an assumed key management method.  Public 
keys are bound to the IP addresses of the network nodes.  Nodes then broadcast their public 
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keys into their neighbourhood zone, for example a two hop radius.  The received public 
keys are used to authenticate future packets from the source node. 
c. Secure Neighbour Discovery 
SLSP uses a Neighbour Location Protocol (NLP) to proactively check that neighbouring 
nodes do not perform impersonation attacks. Link state information is periodically 
broadcast by nodes in the form of a NLP hello message.  These messages are signed by the 
source and contain the source’s MAC address (a unique hardware address) and IP address 
(a distinctive network address).  A NLP hello message broadcast by source S is described 
here: 鯨 蝦 決堅剣欠穴潔欠嫌建" 柑 "" 継賃縄岫荊鶏聴】警畦系聴岻 
Notification messages are generated when conflicting link state information is broadcast.  
An inconsistent mapping of the IP and MAC addresses is considered as conflicting link state 
information. For example when two nodes with different IP addresses have the same 
physical MAC address. 
d. Link State Update Management 
Link state update packets are periodically broadcast to a limited hop radius of nodes.  A link 
state update packet (LSU) contains the IP address of the source, a 32-bit sequence number 
used for updating and a hop count variable.  The LSU hop count variable is authenticated 
using hash chains as discussed in SEAD [Hu et al, 2002] and SAODV [Zapata, 2002] and the 
rest of the packet content is authenticated using digital signatures. 
When a LSU is received the digital signature is verified using the previously distributed 
public key. The hash chain is verified and the time to live (TTL) variable is decremented.  
The hop count authentication protects the LSU packet from travelling too many hops or 
from link state updates not to be received by nodes. 
e. Priority Ranking Scheme 
SLSP uses a lightweight flooding prevention scheme which gives priority ranking to nodes.  
A priority list is maintained for neighbouring nodes which ranks node’s priority based on 
the number of link state updates a node broadcast.  Malicious nodes will flood the network 
with link state update packets to cause resource and denial of service attacks.  SLSP gives 
high priority to nodes that send less link state updates limiting the affects of flooding 
attacks. 
Analysis   
The Secure Link State Routing Protocol is a hybrid cryptographic scheme using digital 
signatures to provide authentication for its NLP hello messages and link state update (LSU) 
packets. Hash chains are used to authenticate the limited hop broadcast of LSU.  
Impersonation type attacks are prevented by monitoring the IP and MAC address bindings 
of neighbours through a neighbour location protocol (NLP). Link state updates are 
authenticated using digital signatures and hash chains.  Flooding type attacks are prevented 
using priority ranking. 
The SLSP protocol provides security to topology discovery but cannot act as a standalone 
security mechanism as it lacks a data transmission protection agent. Nodes that securely join 
the network can misbehave during data transmission without being detected or prevented.   
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SLSP lacks a disciplining agent like a revocation mechanism. For example a malicious node 
B can impersonate another node A and flood A’s neighbours with LSU packets. SLSP’s 
priority mechanism will limit the effectiveness of the flooding attack.  The NLP protocol will 
detect the impersonation attack but node A has no mechanism to correct to the attack and A 
will remain with a low priority. 
2.6 On-Demand Secure routing Byzantine Resilient routing protocol (ODSBR) 
The on-demand secure routing byzantine resilient routing protocol (ODSBR) is proposed in 
[Hu et al, 2003b].  Byzantine behaviour is defined by the authors as any action taken by an 
authenticated node to disrupt the routing procedure.  ODSBR is a secure reputation based 
routing protocol that prevents the effects of byzantine failures on successful routing. 
a. System Overview 
ODSBR uses weighted paths to select routes in the route discovery process.  Paths are 
assigned weights based on a fault path detection method.  A high weight is assigned to an 
unreliable path. ODSBR is divided into three components: route discovery process, fault 
detection, and weight path management.  ODSBR assumes that a public key infrastructure is 
present to manage public key authentication. 
b. Route Discovery Process 
Routes are discovered in an on-demand manner like in DSR. ODSBR extends the standard 
route request RREQ by adding a weight list instead of a node list like in DSR.  A weight list 
includes the list of chained nodes with their associated weights.  These weights are defined 
by link failures detection mechanism.  The RREQ is signed by the source and broadcast into 
the network updating its weighted list after each hop until it reaches the destination. The 
destination then verifies the signature and broadcasts the reply message RREP.  Each node 
that receives a RREP will then calculate the total weight of the path by summing the weights 
of the specific path to the current node.  The RREP forwarded if the total weight is less than 
the total weight of any previously forwarded RREP. Before an intermediate node P forwards 
a suitable RREP all the signatures are verified and node P appends its signature. The source 
node receives the RREP and calculates the total weight and verifies all the signatures. 
c. Fault Detection Method 
Each node i has a list of probe nodes. Each probe node sends node i an acknowledgement 
message for each data packet i sends. If a threshold t of acknowledgements is not received a 
fault accusation is logged against a specific path.  Using a binary search technique ODSBR 
identifies a path as faulty after log(n) fault accusations, where n is the length of the accused 
path. 
d. Weight Path Management 
A low weight is associated with a secure path. The weights associated to paths are 
influenced by two factors: time and fault detection.  When ODSBR identifies a path as faulty 
based on the fault detection method then the weight for that path is doubled. Path weights 
are halved after a counter reaches zero, each path has an associated counter. 
e. Analysis 
The on-demand secure routing protocol (ODSBR) provides ad hoc on-demand routing with 
byzantine failure prevention.  Weights are assigned to paths by a fault detection method and 
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paths are selected based on the weights.  The Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) proposed in 
[Papadimitratos & Hass, 2002] introduces the metric specific path selection method but this 
proposal is not a standalone secure routing protocol like ODSBR [Awerbuch et al, 2008]. 
ODSBR assumes the existence of a public key management system.  ODSBR further assumes 
that a shared key exists between source and destination nodes to ensure authenticity and 
integrity of acknowledgement messages sent by probe nodes.  This helps avoid expensive 
asymmetric per packet computations for acknowledgement messages. 
The route discovery process of ODSBR broadcast reply messages instead of unicasting them 
which results in a computationally expensive operation.  This method will result in に韮鉄袋怠 伐 な  
reply packet transmissions where n+2 is the number of nodes in a path from node A to B 
including nodes A and B [Awerbuch et al, 2008].  Furthermore the cost monitoring of data 
packet transmission is computationally high because the fault detection method requires a 
threshold of t probe nodes to reply with an acknowledgement for every data packet sent. 
ODSBR is identified by authors [Awerbuch et al, 2008] to be vulnerable to wormhole attacks.  
The wormhole attack may be avoided in the case where the wormhole link node exercises 
byzantine behaviour. 
2.7 Reputation based CONFIDANT 
The CONFIDANT protocol representing the ‘Cooperation Of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic 
Ad Hoc Networks’ [Buchegger & Boudec, 2002] is a reputation based solution which 
operates over the DSR routing protocol. 
a. System Overview 
The CONFIDANT solution does not use any cryptographic techniques to achieve secure 
routing. The system is solely reputation-based and operates in an on-demand ad hoc 
network environment as an extension of the DSR routing protocol.  Each node in the ad hoc 
network is required to be involved in the four components of CONFIDANT: monitoring, 
trust management, reputation system and path management.  
b. Monitoring 
Each node is a monitor and is responsible for the packets that it sends or forwards.  For 
every packet that a node forwards it watches that the next hop node forwards the packet 
properly. The monitor looks for inconsistent behaviour and triggers an alarm to the 
reputation system if misbehaviour is discovered. 
c. Trust Management 
The trust management system manages the alarm messages. The alarm messages are 
generated by each node’s monitoring system and exchanged between other nodes as to 
build and maintain a local rating list.  The trust management manages the input of alarm 
messages and assigns more influence to alarm messages that come from trusted nodes and 
less influence from other nodes. CONFIDANT assumes pre-existing relationships between a 
selection of nodes called friends [Buchegger & Boudec, 2002], friend nodes are highly 
trusted nodes. Local rating lists are exchanged as well and their influence managed by the 
trust management system. 
d. Reputation System 
The reputation system manages and maintains the local rating list.  This list contains node 
identities and corresponding rating. A rating will correspond to the amount of 
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misbehaviour a node has displayed.  The ratings will be updated from alarm messages and 
direct observations. 
e. Path Management 
Paths are selected based on a rating threshold, local rating lists and a blacklist containing all 
untrusted nodes.  A node is blacklisted when its rating is below the rating threshold t.  The 
path manager removes the paths in the network which contain the blacklisted node.  The 
path manager manages the route discovery process by reacting to route requests from 
blacklisted nodes or route requests that have passed through a blacklisted node. 
f. Analysis 
CONFIDANT is an exclusively reputation based routing protocol.  Local rating lists of 
node’s behaviour is recorded and used during the route discovery process.  The authors 
note that only negative evidence is gathered against nodes so nodes can only be identified as 
less trusted as the network continues.  Like most reputation based schemes a counter system 
is employed where each rating list entry has an associated counter.  When the counter 
reaches zero the rating is reset to the default state of null misbehaving accusations.  The 
CONFIDANT protocol assumes the existence of prior trust relationships between a selected 
number of nodes called friends [Buchegger & Boudec, 2002]. 
2.8 Discussion 
Several different secure routing protocols are presented in Section- 2.2 they differ in the 
areas of security and operational requirements. The diversity of their design makes it 
difficult to compare their success but this section outlines the diverse characteristics of the 
presented protocols. 
a. Security Analysis 
The proposals can be categorized by the security techniques which include the asymmetric, 
symmetric and hybrid cryptographic security approaches. The last category is the 
reputation based solutions.  The security mechanism of each protocol is presented and the 
attacks which the protocol protects against are highlighted.  A summary of the evaluation is 
presented in Table -2. 
Symmetric Cryptography 
The symmetric cryptographic approaches include the Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distance 
Vector Routing protocol (SEAD) and the Ariadne protocol.  Hash functions and hash chains 
like SHA-1 [Publications F IPS, 2008] and MD5 [Rivest, 1992] are used for authentication 
purposes usually for the hop count variable.  The hash function is lightweight compared to 
asymmetric security techniques.   
The SEAD approach uses a hop-by-hop authentication technique.  SEAD authenticates the 
sequence number and hop count of routing packets protecting the routing procedure from 
resource consumption attacks for example denial of service attacks, route table poisoning, 
and replay attacks. 
The Ariadne protocol is proposed by the same authors of SEAD. Ariadne uses  
message authentication code (MAC) to provide end-to-end authentication between 
communication nodes. Ariadne protects against similar attacks to SEAD but uses end-to-end 
authentication. 
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Protocol Security Approach Techniques Attack Prevention 
SEAD  
[Hu et al, 2002]  
Symmetric 
Cryptography 
‚ Hop-by-hop 
authentication 
‚ Hash chains 
‚ Resource 
consumption 
‚ Denial of Service 
‚ Route table attack 
‚ Replay 
Ariadne 
 [Hu et al, 2005]  
Symmetric 
Cryptography 
‚ End-to-end 
authentication 
‚ Hash chains 
‚ Resource 
consumption 
‚ Denial of Service 
‚ Route table attack 
‚ Replay 
ARAN  
[Sanzgiri et al, 2002]  
Asymmetric 
Cryptography 
‚ End-to-end 
authentication 
‚ Certificate Authority 
‚ Route table attack 
‚ Replay attacks 
SAODV  
[Zapata, 2002]  
Hybrid 
Cryptography 
‚ End-to-end 
authentication 
‚ Hash chains 
‚ Digital Signatures 
‚ Denial of Service 
‚ Route table attack 
‚ Replay 
SLSP 
[Papadimitratos & 
Hass, 2003]  
Hybrid 
Cryptography 
‚ Secure neighbour 
discovery 
‚ Authenticated link state 
updates 
‚ Denial of Service 
‚ Route table attack 
‚ Replay 
ODSRP [Awerbuch 
et al, 2008]  
Reputation Based ‚ Path specific reputation 
lists 
‚ Digital Signatures 
‚ Denial of Service 
‚ Route table attack 
‚ Replay 
‚ Byzantine Failures 
CONFIDANT 
[Buchegger & 
Boudec, 2002]  
Reputation Based ‚ Node specific reputation 
lists 
‚ Black Hole 
‚ Replay 
Table 2. Summary of security analysis for secure routing in ad hoc networks 
Asymmetric Cryptography 
The only solely asymmetric cryptographic approach investigated is the Authenticated 
Routing for Ad hoc Networks protocol (ARAN). Asymmetric cryptographic is 
computationally costly compared to symmetric cryptography and it requires the existence of 
a trusted third party or self organized key management system. 
ARAN provides end-to-end authentication for an on-demand mobile ad hoc network.  
ARAN provides authentication and protecting from replay attacks and unauthorized 
routing table attacks.  ARAN is vulnerable to flooding attacks.  A malicious node can flood 
nodes with fake routing packets signed with illegitimate keys this will result in many 
unsuccessful verifications and ultimately denial of service and resource consumption. 
Hybrid Cryptography 
The SAODV and SLSP protocols are hybrid solutions which employ both asymmetric 
cryptography and symmetric cryptography. The common approach is for all the mutual 
fields to be digitally signed and the immutable fields, like the hop count, to be protected 
using hash chains. The Secure Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector protocol (SAODV) 
employs this tactic to provide end-to-end authentication but at the cost of extending the 
routing packet header. SAODV protects against impersonation attacks on the routing 
protocol.  It also helps prevent replay and denial of service attacks. 
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Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP) provides secure neighbour discovery and 
authenticated link state updates but lack a secure data transmission protocol. The 
Neighbour Location Protocol of SLSP protects against impersonation type attacks where 
malicious nodes adopting conflicting IP and MAC addresses would want to corrupt the 
routing table.  Furthermore flooding attacks, which result in resource consumption and a 
denial of services, are prevented by a priority ranking scheme. 
Reputation Based 
Reputation based or conduct based systems allow for a nodes behaviour in the network to 
affect its assigned security or trustworthiness. Reputation based protocol can be 
computationally costly because they usually require packet monitoring systems and the 
proactive exchange or behavioural evidence between nodes. The On-demand Secure 
Routing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Failures (ODSBR) and the CONFIDANT protocol 
are reputation based systems. 
ODSBR uses reputation based system to select the most secure routes. A fault detection 
method monitors the success of each packet transmission and faults are logged against 
specific paths. Reputation is path specific in ODSBR. ODSBR couples with asymmetric 
cryptographic approach to provide end-to-end authentication along the selected secure 
path. The CONFIDANT uses exclusively reputation based techniques to provide security.  
Similarly to ODSBR only negative evidence is considered. Nodes monitor every packet 
which they forward and maintain a local rating list.  Reputation or ratings are node specific 
unlike ODSBR.  Both CONFIDANT and ODSBR monitor packet forwarding this will protect 
the system from black hole attacks. Replay attacks which use the method flooding are 
prevented using path reputation and node reputation in ODSBR and CONFIDANT 
respectively. A disadvantage of the negative reputation approach for ODSBR and 
CONFIDANT is that black list nodes or faulty path entries have an expiration time after 
which their confidence is reinstated.  This allows malicious nodes to continue disrupting the 
network until they are caught again.    
b. Operational Requirements 
The presented secure ad hoc routing protocols have certain assumptions that each makes to 
realize its design. Furthermore protocols are designed specifically for operation in specific 
routing environments. This section summarizes the operational requirements of the 
presented secure ad hoc routing protocols.  Table -3 summarizes this discussion. 
The symmetric cryptographic approaches do not rely on a public key infrastructure but still 
require some kind of key management in the ad hoc network. The SEAD protocol is 
designed for a table-driven routing protocol and is based on the DSVD routing protocol.  
SEAD requires a key management mechanism to distribute an authenticated initial hash 
element. Ariadne is a DSR based on-demand protocol which assumes there are shared 
secrets between each communication pair. The shared keys are used in TESLA 
authentication and a key management system is assumed present to distribute the keys.  
TESLA authentication also requires time synchronization between each node.  This is 
difficult without the presence of an online TTP. 
ARAN, SAODV, SLSP and ODSBR use asymmetric cryptography and key management is 
simply assumed for each of these protocols. ARAN assumes that an online TTP is present 
that acts as a certificate authority (CA). Prior shared secrets are assumed between all 
participating nodes and the CA. ARAN is an on-demand protocol. SAODV protocol is based 
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on the AODV on-demand routing protocol and assumes the presence of a key management 
system to distribute keys.  SLSP assumes that nodes enter the network with asymmetric key 
pairs and a key management scheme is present to certify the keys in the network.  SLSP is a 
table based routing solution. ODSBR is based on DSR routing and authenticates its routing 
packets with digital signatures and a public key infrastructure is assumed to manage the 
keys. Shared keys are also assumed to allow for authentic acknowledgement message 
communication between source and probe nodes. 
 
Protocol Routing  Assumption 
SEAD  
[Hu et al, 2002]  
Table Driven 
DSDV based 
‚ Key management system to distribute 
an authenticated element for hash 
chaining 
Ariadne  
[Hu et al, 2005]  
On-Demand 
DSR based 
‚ Time synchronized network 
‚ Shared secret key between each node 
pairs for MAC 
‚ Key management system to manage 
TESLA keys 
ARAN [Sanzgiri 
et al, 2002]  
On-Demand 
Not protocol 
specific 
‚ TTP acting as a certificate authority 
(CA) 
‚ Prior shared CA public key 
SAODV [Zapata, 
2002]  
On-Demand 
AODV based 
‚ Key management scheme  
‚ Secure IP public key binding 
SLSP 
[Papadimitratos & 
Hass, 2003]  
Table Driven 
Not protocol 
specific 
‚ Nodes have existing asymmetric key 
pair 
‚ Key management system 
ODSRP 
[Awerbuch et al, 
2008]  
On-Demand 
DSR based 
‚ Key management system 
‚ Shared keys between source and probe 
nodes 
CONFIDANT 
[Buchegger & 
Boudec, 2002]  
On-Demand 
Not protocol 
specific 
‚ Pre-existing relationships between a 
selection of nodes called friends 
Table 3. Operational requirements of the present secure routing protocols 
CONFIDANT does not use cryptographic techniques and does not require the existence of a 
key management scheme. CONFIDANT does assume pre-existing relationships between a 
small number of nodes called friends. The CONFIDANT solution is designed for on demand 
routing. 
From this discussion, the conclusion is made that most secure ad hoc routing protocols 
assume the existence of a key management system to certify, authenticate, and distribute 
keying information. Mobile ad hoc networks cannot assume the existence of a TTP and must 
address the problem of key management. 
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3. Proposed security scheme: Direct Indirect Trust Distribution (DITD) 
A security establishment scheme is proposed for a mobile ad hoc network. Key management 
is central to the establishment of trust in these networks.  The proposal focuses on key 
management.  The proposal is for a mobile ad hoc network, which operates in a self-
organized and fully distributive network environment.  These networks allow for nodes to 
join and exit the network, unrestricted.  These networks find application in the military and 
commercial filed. For example application can be found in, tactical positional networks for 
military based communication or personal area networks for secure peer-to-peer data and 
file sharing. The proposed protocol is planned for these self-organized distributive 
networks.  It is noted that these networks do not allow for rigorous access control. The 
proposed protocol can be extended to allow access control services.  
In a self-organized mobile ad hoc network, there is no presence of a separate authority 
member, such as a trusted third part or certificate authority. Instead each node that enters the 
network is considered the security authority of its own domain.  Security is established by 
nodes creating and issuing certificates which bind nodal identities to their respective public 
keys. These certificates are issued and distributed in order to realize secure communication.  A 
bi-directional security association is made between nodes A and B, when node A holds a 
certificate binding the public key of B and B’s identity; and B holds the certificate binding the 
public key of A and A’s identity. Malicious adversary nodes that wish to disrupt 
communication will target the network layer, and more specifically the routing mechanism, as 
identified in the previous chapter.  The network layer is identified as the sphere of design. 
The problem is then to provide secure communication, which is implemented on the 
network layer.  Secure communication is achieved when node A is able to set up a secure 
communication channel, where no other entity can interrupt or eavesdrop on its 
communication with node B. The question as to whether node B is worthy of trust, is not the 
concern. That question must be decided by the nodes themselves, based on available trust 
evidence. The proposal made on the network layer aims to provide the most secure route 
between A and B, preventing malicious adversaries from sabotaging communication.  
The term trust is defined as the “belief by a trustor with respects to the competence, honesty, 
security and dependability of a trustee within a specific context.” [Grandison, 2003]. There 
are two trust variables: direct trust and indirect trust. Direct trust is a result of independent 
or local trust evaluation between two immediate nodes.  Indirect trust is evaluated using the 
advice from other nodes. In the context of certificate base trust, direct trust is defined as 
trust between local neighbours. Indirect trust is created by certificate chaining. 
A hybrid trust model is proposed, uniting certificate and conduct based trust to provide a 
more secure communication. A key management model is also proposed. This model 
supports an existing routing protocol.  The proposed scheme is called Direct, Indirect Trust 
Distribution (DITD) and it follows the following procedure: direct trust is established by 
requesting that all nodes involved in the route discovery stage, share their self certificates 
with each others’ one-hop neighbours involved in the route discovery phase.  Indirect trust 
is further established by requesting that the sender’s self certificate propagates with the 
route request towards the destination. The routing messages trigger certificate distribution 
allowing direct trust relationships between one-hop neighbours. These trust relationships 
are then chained together providing a trusted route to the destination node. Keying material 
is allowed to be propagated along these chains of trust. A disadvantage of the self-organized 
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nature of these networks is that the established security of trust chains will rely on transitive 
trust [Capkun et al, 2003]. The DITD model proposes coupling the security provided by the 
certificates with a conduct based trust analysis model. Conduct trust is affix, which allows 
for more secure communication.  This is achieved by calculating the trust of routes, based on 
the conduct of the nodes involved, and selecting the most trusted route for communication.  
3.1 Related work 
A detailed survey was presented on key management schemes for mobile ad hoc networks 
in the previous chapter. Section-2 focused on the network layer and presented a survey of 
existing secure routing protocols. This section provides work directly related to the DITD 
model. 
The authors of [Capkun et al, 2003] propose a completely self organized public key system 
for mobile ad hoc wireless networks. This is a PGP based solution which provides key 
management in ad hoc networks without the presence of an off-line or on-line authority, like 
a CA, TTP or server. Each node distributes its self certificates and maintains its own 
certificate repositories. Nodes participating in the network share their certificate repositories 
and repository updates are preformed in a proactive manner. Certificates are reciprocally 
authenticated and trust chains formed linking remote nodes to each other. Security is 
realized on the application layer. 
Zapata [Zapata, 2006] addresses the issue of verification delays in secure mobile ad hoc 
networks.  Zapata proposes a protocol to optimize the number of verifications made in a 
single secure route discovery phase. Once a route is established only then are the shared 
certificates verified.  This helps in reducing the computational overhead of verifications on 
multi-hop paths. By reducing the total number of verifications made in a network’s life time 
there is a resultant end-to-end delay upon the delivery of routes. 
Theodorakopoulos et al. [Theodorakopoulos & Baras, 2006] proposes a fully distributive 
conduct based trust model which has PGP characteristics. This model operates on the 
application layer and allows for trust to be established without the presence of a central 
authority member.  PGP models share certificates to establish trust while the work proposed 
in [Theodorakopoulos & Baras, 2006] allows for other trust evidence, like conduct and 
location, to influence the trust establishment. Trust is fully distributed in a proactive manner 
allowing all nodes to give trust opinions about other nodes. 
Semiring mathematics presented in [Kscischang et al, 2001] has more recently been used to 
model trust calculations in [Theodorakopoulos & Baras, 2006]. Trust opinions are 
mathematically aggregated along a path and trust decisions are mathematically represented.  
The work in [Theodorakopoulos & Baras, 2006] uses Dijsktra’s extended algorithm proposed 
by Mohri [Mohri, 2002] to include trust. This finds the most trusted path between two 
remote nodes in a proactive manner. 
The majority of literature mentioned function in a proactive manner for application layer 
solutions. The DITD model is designed on the network layer for a reactive, fully distributive, 
self organized, mobile ad hoc network environment.  The ideas of some of these protocols 
have inspired the creation of the DITD model and the impact of these protocols is discussed 
in Section-4. 
3.2 Proposed security scheme 
The aim is to design and investigate a security mechanism to specifically provide: public key 
certificate distribution, optimal verification, and a conduct trust model to optimize trust decisions.  
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The security mechanism is to provide secure communication in a mobile ad hoc network 
environment while satisfying the following requirements based on environment and 
functionality. 
a. Design Requirements 
Environment 
‚ Network layer design:  The security mechanism is to be implemented on the network 
layer protecting these dynamic networks from attacks and avoiding multi-layer design. 
‚ Self organised: Nodes are responsible for their own security services, including the 
distribution of keying information. 
‚ Fully distributive: The certificate distribution scheme is to be designed in a fully 
distributive manner where all nodes participate in the operation and implementation. 
‚ On-demand: The DITD model is to be design in an on-demand environment optimizing 
the limited resources of ad hoc networks.  On-demand models provide security to 
nodes upon request.  The proactive approach provides security to an entire network at 
once and requires computationally taxing periodic updates. 
Functionality 
‚ Distribution of keying material: DITD is to provide direct and indirect trust 
relationships between local and remote nodes by efficiently distributing self certificates 
between nodes. 
‚ Minimize the overhead: DITD aims to minimize the overheads upon the network 
routing performance while still providing trust establishment.  DITD aims to avoid 
alterations to the routing control packets and strives for independence between routing 
and trust establishment. 
‚ Provide secure communication from the start: Secure communication is requested 
from the start to the end of the network lifetime unlike the model proposed in [Tanabe 
& Aida, 2007] which is flawed by an initial setup phase with weak security. 
‚ Trust evaluation mechanism: Security should be supported by a trust evaluation 
mechanism allowing for more secure routes to be established and ensuring the secure 
distribution of certificates.  
‚ Robust in the presence of topology change:  The DITD model should be robust to poor 
connectivity and routing failure due to changing mobility which is an inherent 
characteristic of a mobile ad hoc network. 
b. System Model 
To fulfil the constraints given in above, we assume the following system model.  There is no 
pre-existing infrastructure and no online trusted third party present during communication.  
The model is a fully distributive network of wireless nodes using an ad hoc on-demand 
routing mechanism.  It is assumed that nodes have their own keying material before joining 
the network generated by a fully self organized mobile ad hoc network [Capkun et al, 2003], 
or by an off-line authority issuing keying material before a node enters the network for 
example in [Capkun et al, 2006].  Each node is assumed to have a public and private key 
pair; a self certificate binding the public key and user identification of the node; and a set of 
network security parameters common to all nodes in the network.  Secure communication is 
requested from the start to the end of the network’s lifetime.  Users can join and leave the 
network without any restrictions.  Any user with the correct keying material may participate 
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in the network.  It is assumed that conduct information is available to each node from node 
monitors [Tseng et al, 2003].   
The DITD model uses certificate based trust coupled with conduct based trust to develop a 
hybrid trust protocol maximizing trust in the network.  The DITD model addresses the 
issues of key exchange, verification protocol and conduct trust evaluation.  It is designed on the 
network layer accompanying an on-demand routing protocol.  Figure 2 describes the high-
level system model. 
The DITD scheme performs the task of key exchange, exchanging self certificates on the 
network layer following an on-demand routing mechanism.  Direct trust is established by 
self certificate exchanges among one-hop neighbours, triggered by the route discovery 
process.  This allows for a bi-directional security association to be made between immediate 
nodes, we refer to this relationship as direct trust.  Direct trust associations are chained 
together creating trusted paths and allowing for two nodes, out of each other’s 
communication range, to exchange self certificates.  This describes the key exchange element 
of the DITD model.  It is divided into two parts: the exchange of direct and indirect trust 
relations.  Figure 3 illustrates the direct, indirect trust relations established by DITD. 
An on-demand route discovery phase will flood the network with route requests in search 
of a destination.  This will couple with the key exchange mechanism of DITD.  The result of 
this is a flood of self-certificate exchanges.  Verification of these certificates is optimized by 
the DITD model.  Trust chains will have an accumulative certificate verification delay 
because possibly each direct trust association will need to be verified. The DITD model 
proposes a verification protocol which optimizes and manages the verification process. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. High level system model 
DITD uses the existence of conduct trust evidence to maximize the security provided by 
public key certificates. Trust is aggregated in a reactive manner using semi-ring 
mathematics and a reactive shortest path algorithm. The most trusted routes are selected by 
a conduct evaluation protocol which includes an implicit revocation mechanism and trust 
evaluation metric. Direct and indirect trust establishment is strengthened by DITD’s conduct 
trust evaluation. 
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Pi, stage two begins.  At stage two a reverse route to A is then set up and Pi checks if it is the 
destination B or has a fresh route to the destination node B.  If not then the RREQ is further 
broadcast by Pi and propagates until the destination is found.  When the destination or a 
fresh route to the destination is found stage three commences. At stage three a reply 
message RREP is propagated along the reverse route until it reaches the source node A 
establishing the communication route.  
When a node receives a routing control packet, certificate requests are triggered and sent 
using separate unicast messages.  The certificate distribution is added at stage two and stage 
three, the receiving of a route request and the sending of a reply message respectfully.  In 
Table-4 we define the symbols we used next in our explanation.  
 
Pi intermediate node i receiving the RREQ 
Pi-1 previous node Pi-1 who forwards RREQ to its neighbour Pi 
A originator node of RREQ message 
B destination node of RREQ message 
Certi certificate of node Pi 
Table 4. Definition of symbols 
At stage two upon receiving a route request packet, before this packet is processed and the 
routing table updated, direct trust and indirect trust establishment is set up. 
Direct Trust 
At stage two, direct trust relationships are made by sharing neighbouring nodes self 
certificates.  When intermediate node Pi receives a route request RREQ it first checks its 
certificate repository for the certificate of the neighbour who forwarded the request, Pi-1.  If it 
does not possess such a certificate, Certi-1, a local self certificate exchange is done between 
node Pi and its previous hop neighbour Pi-1 as follows:  a unicast message is sent from Pi to 
Pi-1 with Pi’s self certificate Certi appended; Pi-1 receives the message, updates its certificate 
repository and replies with a unicast message to Pi containing Pi-1’s certificate. If the 
certificate Certi-1 is found in Pi’s certificate repository there is no need for a self certificate 
exchange.  This procedure follows the RREQ as it floods the network in search of a route to 
the destination node.  Direct trust establishment is illustrated in Figure 5. This, as it is 
expected, causes an increase in control packet overhead as the DITD model transmits 
additional certificate packets into the network. 
A second direct trust establishment approach is proposed, which exploits the HELLO 
packets of the AODV routing protocol. The AODV protocol uses periodic one-hop 
broadcasts packet to maintain and establish communication between neighbouring nodes.  
The DITD model proposes that direct trust can be established independent of the route 
discovery process by including a certificate query in the HELLO packets.  When a HELLOA 
packet is broadcast by node A and received by node B, the receiver B checks its certificate 
repository for the certificate certA.  In a similar way to the first approach if no certificate is 
found a localized certificate exchange is performed.  The certificate exchange messages are 
independent from the HELLO packets. The second approach allows for direct trust 
establishment with the least amount of dependence on the routing procedure.   
Indirect Trust 
Still at the stage two (receiving the routing request) indirect trust is established between 
remote nodes A and B by the exchange of remote self certificates.  Similarly to the direct 
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trust set up, before node Pi processes the received routing request RREQ a certificate search 
and exchange is made.  Node Pi searches for the source A’s certificate, CertA.  If the certificate 
is not found, Pi sends a separate unicast certificate request for CertA to the previous node Pi-1, 
whose address can be found at the next hop on the reverse route in the routing table.  This 
addition allows for the source’s certificate CertA to be propagated towards the destination B.   
It is noted that by not appending the certificate to the route requests this reduces 
dependency between the route establishment and certificate trust establishment. 
For indirect trust to be complete between nodes A and B, the source A is required to possess 
the destination’s certificate, CertB. Further additions to stage three, sending the reply 
message, are required to complete the indirect trust establishment. A reply is sent is sent 
under two conditions.  Firstly when the destination node is found and secondly when a 
fresh route to the destination node is found.   
For the first condition, the reverse route to the source A is already setup with localized 
direct trust existing between nodes on the route. Therefore a trusted chain of nodes is 
available from B toward the originator node A. All that is required is for the certificate of the 
destination node, CertB, to be piggy backed on the routing reply message RREP toward B.  
Each intermediate node stores CertB and updates its certificate repository and the forward 
route to B. 
For the second condition, if a fresh route to B is found at Pi, there exists a route from the 
intermediate node Pi to the destination B and a route from Pi to the source A.  Both routes 
have localized direct trust existing already.  Two RREP messages are then propagated, one 
toward B with CertA appended and one toward A with the CertB appended.  Indirect trust is 
therefore set up by certificate chaining as illustrated in Figure 5.   
c. Verification Protocol 
For trust to be established between two entities they must not only share the certificates but 
the certificates must be verified for the users to be authenticated.  Ideally verification will 
take place immediately after a certificate is received but a single verification can take up to 
1ms delay [Stephan Eichler, 2006] on 1024-bit RSA key, and even more for a ECC key.  These 
verifications can accumulate across multi hop routes.  For application specific networks that 
are time dependent like audio applications and military automation networks a delay of 
milliseconds is critical. A requirement of DITD is for the security additions not to cripple or 
delay the existing routing mechanism.   
Verification for direct trust establishment can be done immediately without incurring a 
delay upon the routing mechanism.  This is because the localised certificate messages are 
separate and independent from the request messages.  Furthermore during route discovery, 
request messages (RREQ) can be forwarded without waiting for verification to be processed 
[Zapata, 2006] as verification can be confirmed on the reply route.  Delayed confirmation of 
verification is not possible for the reply message (RREP) because the exchange of the 
destination node’s certificate, CertB, follows the RREP message.  The CertB certificate must be 
verified before the RREP message can be securely forwarded and trusted routes established.  
This means that a certificate trust chain will have an accumulative processing delay due to 
verifications. Therefore the problem is that the verification of the destination certificate CertB 
may cause a delay in route establishment because CertB is distributed with the RREP 
message.  
A solution to this is that if any intermediate node has CertB, it can distribute CertB to the 
reverse route, during RREQ message propagation. When a RREQ message is forwarded a 
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Fig. 5. Illustrating the certificate exchange protocol 
flag is appended identifying if the forwarder has the destination certificate CertB.  
Intermediate node P receives the RREQ message and updates the reverse route entry with 
flagcert indicating if the previous hop has CertB. P checks if it has CertB in its certificate 
repository and assigns an appropriate value to flagcert before forwarding the RREQ message.  
If P has CertB and the reverse route variable flagcert indicates that the previous hop does not 
have CertB then P sends a unicast certificate message containing CertB to the previous hop, 
whose identity can be found from the reverse route in the routing table. The CertB is 
propagated along the reverse route by checking the routing table entry flagcert and 
responding in a similar fashion. This allows the destination certificate CertB to be distributed 
during the route discovery phase independent from route establishment.  The verification 
protocol is illustrated in Figure 6 where source A sends a RREQ for destination B and 
intermediate node P2 has CertB but no route to B itself.  In this case while route discovery 
continues CertB is transmitted to the nodes in the reverse route which do not have CertB, 
these nodes are indicated by the flagCert variable.  Certificate verification is done concurrently 
with route discovery therefore minimising the amount of verifications that delay the route 
discovery.  Outstanding verifications are done following the RREP. Verification checks are 
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preformed with the RREP message. Figure 6‘s example allows for three less verification 
delays at P2, P1 and A because of back tracked verification. 
The condition under which the above will be most effective is when a node has received 
CertB during a previous route establishment but it no longer has an existing route in its 
routing table for B.  Such an occurrence is a result of a node previously involved in a route 
to B but due to route expiry, loss of connectivity or node mobility the node is no longer part 
of such a route.  Therefore the benefits of the verification protocol are most evident in ad hoc 
networks with moderate to high speeds. The DITD model implements verification 
optimization to reduce the delay incurred on the routing mechanism by verification. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Illustration of verification protocol 
The authentication protocols ARAN, SAODV, SEAD or Ariadne discourage intermediate 
nodes with a route to the destination to reply to route requests.  If the DITD model would be 
used in conjunction with such a protocol then although intermediate node with a validate 
destination certificate are unauthorized to reply DITD maximizes the availability of the 
destination certificate. The verification protocol would be used to distribute the destination’s 
certificate it along the reverse path and perform verification checks so lesser time delay is 
incurred from the route reply message. 
Direct and indirect trust establishment is realised through the route establishment phase of 
the ad hoc routing scheme.  During the initial stage of route establishment the network is 
flooded with routing requests and in turn certificate exchange messages.  It can be expected 
that there will be a large packet overhead as a result of additional certificate packets.   
Mobility produces erratic connectivity problems and unexpected routing failure.  Multi-hop 
routes are vulnerable to failure under increased mobility while localised one-hop route 
connections are less vulnerable.   If the proposed solution was dependent upon such multi-
hop routes, like [Capkun et al, 2006] is, it would suffer severely from inherit link breakages 
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common to highly mobile networks.  The proposed solution prevents the certificate 
exchange procedure from using multi-hop routes by exchanging certificates in a strictly 
localized manner.  This allows the DITD certificate distribution scheme to operate in ad hoc 
networks with varied mobility’s and changing connectivity without the worry of routing 
failure interfering with security. 
d. Conduct Trust Evaluation 
Providing conduct based trust enhances the trust decision made by nodes and therefore 
effect keying decisions: “Conduct trust influences decisions like access control, choice of 
public keys, etc. It could be useful as a complement to a public key infrastructure (PKI), 
where an entity would accept or reject a public key according to the trustworthiness of the 
entities that vouch for it; this is the idea behind PGP web of trust [Abdul-Rahman, 1997].  It 
also provides trust influence at the network layer allowing for routes to be selected based on 
trust.  Trust Establishment incorporates the following functions: specification of evidence, 
generation, distribution, discovery and evaluation of trust evidence.  The scope of the work 
focuses upon trust evaluation rather than the collecting of trust evidence from the network 
and the semantics of such trust evidence.  These issues are still important, and need to be 
addressed in a complete system. 
Trust Representation 
The DITD model represents trust on a weighted trust graph G(V,E) by a trust opinion.  The 
trust opinion is a numeric trust variable which is a function of the available confidence and 
trustworthiness evidence.   
 ( , ) [0,5]i evidence evidence itrust t c t? Œ  (1) 
A high trust opinion means that the node is a good node, or that the node provides highly 
accurate location information, or that the certificate issued by the node is highly trusted.  
Trust is further influenced by network operation confidence. This includes the duration of a 
node’s participation in the network, or the lack of negative evidence against the node. 
The trust function, trust, computes the available evidence (tevidence and cevidence) into a semantic 
numeric representation of trust. Trust is represented at each node or vertex of the trust 
graph. The work focuses upon the evaluation of routes and the assignment of trust to 
individual nodes is assumed to be taken care of by a network monitoring system.    
A trust variable, ti, will be assigned and stored at each node or vertex of the trust graph.  
Each node entering the network with a valid self-certificate is provided with a default trust 
value td.  The DITD model can be extended to include access control and allow for a trusted 
outside member to assign trust values to nodes entering the network.  This would allow for 
a more secure system with limited or specified users and still maintain the self organized 
nature of the network. 
Trust is assigned to the established routes including both one-hop neighbouring routes and 
multi-hop routes.  In an on-demand routing environment, nodes maintain a routing table 
storing the routes to each known node.  A trust variable tAB will be assigned to each of these 
routes representing the aggregated trust from the source node A to node B.  The duration of 
time for which these routes are maintained securely will influence the weight of trust 
assigned to the edges of the trust graph.  The trust of nodes (ti) and trust of routes (tAB) will 
change as the network progresses and new trust evidence is made available. The 
representation of trust is illustrated on weighted trust graph G(V,E) in Figure 7. 
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Certificate based trust provides the user with binary trust, i.e. when two nodes share 
certificates they trust each other; otherwise they don’t trust each other.  DITD represents 
trust with a range from 0 to 5.  Where 0 represents a malicious node or a node not worthy of 
trust and 5 represent a full confidence in the certificate and trustworthiness of the node.  
This gives the trust graph system some flexibility.   
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Weighted Direct Trust Graph 
When inconsistent data is shared then a trust accusation may be made against offenders 
reducing the trust of the node and the routes in which it participates. A proposal is made to 
use the route maintenance mechanism implemented by the on-demand routing protocol, to 
help establish the confidence and trust variables.  The purpose of the route maintenance is to 
maintain the routes and to share neighbourhood information.  This allows for provided trust 
evidence to be shared in a localized manner. This maintenance protocol allows nodes to 
“monitor” their neighbours and when inconsistent data is shared then a trust accusation 
may be made against the offender. 
The DITD model inherits aspects of the semiring mathematical trust representation 
following semiring properties which are used for aggregating trust opinions along and 
across paths. The distance semiring operators ¸  and ̊  are applied to optimize trust 
accumulation.  The ̊ operator is used to add trust values along a trusted certificate chain.  
The ̊  operator allows for a final trust value to be calculated representing a chain of nodes 
with different trust values. Trust values will be aggregated along a path like parallel 
resistors would be summed i.e. 
1 2
1 1 1 1
...
T nR R R R
? - - - .  The trust will decrease along the 
path and the final trust of the path can be no larger than the lowest trust value.  This aligns 
with the description of a trust chain which states that a chain is as strong as its weakest link.  
The distant semiring approach is based on Eiser proposal [Hu et al, 2002]. Figure 5 
illustrates how trust is aggregated along a path and stored representing the trust of a 
specific route between node A and B. 
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In summary, methods are proposed to allow for a trust semantic but this is not the focus of 
the work.  The assumption is made that trust evidence is available and that each weighted 
vertex has been assigned a trust value. 
Trust Evaluation 
The conduct based proposal compliments the certificate exchange and verification 
mechanism forming a hybrid security model which embraces certificate trust establishment 
as well as conduct based trust.  Ideas from the modified proactive generic-single-source-
shortest-distance algorithm [Theodorakopoulos & Baras, 2006] [Mohri, 2002] are inherited 
and we propose to apply this semiring mathematical formulae to the reactive on-demand 
trust path discovery phase of the routing protocol.  The generic-single-source-shortest-
distance algorithm calculates the shortest path from a source node to all nodes in the 
network, working in a proactive manner. The DTID proposal is a reactive path specific 
model. DITD will have a hand in the selection of the multi-hop routes therefore its operation 
will lie in the network layer. The DITD model modifies and optimizes the shortest path 
algorithm on the network layer. The following modifications are made to the trust path 
discovery phase as to compliment the certificate based model with a conduct based model 
evaluating trust along a path. 
1. Trust is aggregated along the RREQ path 
The distance semiring mathematic operator ̊ [Mohri, 2002] is used to allow for trust to be 
calculated for a route from source node S through intermediate nodes 1 to n toward 
destination node D.  Trust for this path is a function of the participating nodes. 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3
1 2 3
( , , , ..., , ) ...
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
...
SD S n D S n D SD
S n D
trust t t t t t t t t t t t t t
t t t t t t
? ̊ ̊ ̊ ̊ ̊ ̊ ?
Ã ÔÄ ÕÄ Õ? Ä Õ- - - - - -Ä ÕÅ Ö
 (2) 
Trust is aggregated along the path that the RREQ propagates. The trust of the route is 
updated at every hop and the trust value is stored in the routing table of the intermediate 
nodes with respects to the level of trust of the reverse path to the source.   
2. Trust is aggregated along the RREP path 
Similarly to 1 the trust from the destination to the source is aggregated using the distance 
semiring formulae. 
 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1( , , , ..., , ) ...DS D n n n S D n n n S DStrust t t t t t t t t t t t t t/ / / / / /? ̊ ̊ ̊ ̊ ̊ ̊ ?  (3) 
Although the total trust between the source and destination is already calculated after 
RREQ’s propagation, this step is necessary to provide appropriate trust values for the 
forward path recorded in the intermediate node’s routing table. 
The aggregation of trust is illustrated in Figure 8 where source node, S, sends a RREQ 
message to destination node D, and at each hop of the RREQ message the trust is calculated 
and stored as a trust value associated with the reverse route to S.  The trust associations are 
tSP1 , tSP2 and finally tSD which is the trust for the route between S and D.  Figure 8 also 
follows the RREP message calculating the trust associated with the forward routes stored in 
the routing table.  Figure 8 shows that trust is route specific and trust must be aggregated 
along both the RREP and RREQ paths. 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design
www.intechopen.com
Trust Establishment in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks:  
Direct Trust Distribution-Performance and Simulation 543 
3. Implicit revocation:  Filter trust path discovery participation 
The nodes that participate in the trust path discovery process must all have an acceptable 
value of trust.  This therefore eliminates untrusted nodes from participating in the multi-hop 
routes; this also eliminates low level trust paths from being discovered. Before a RREQ 
message is processed and forwarded, the aggregated trust of the propagating route request 
is compared to a trust threshold tthresh.  If the trust is lower than the tthresh then the RREQ 
message is discarded. 
 RREQ thresht t>  (4) 
This procedure will act as an implicit revocation mechanism for DITD.  A trust chain is as 
weak as its weakest link, therefore if the weakest links are not considered then their 
corresponding weak trust chains are not considered either.  This modification helps find the 
most trusted path and reduces unnecessary network computation and message propagation.   
 
 
Fig. 8. Illustration of trust aggregated along RREQ and RREP path 
4. Filter the most trusted path 
Figure 9 illustrates this step.  When the RREP is propagated back to the source node, it is 
very possible that multiple routes are found therefore an intermediate node may receive 
more than one RREP message.  In this case the first RREP is forwarded and successive 
RREP’s are only forwarded based on their sequence number or total trust value, effectively 
filtering the most recent and most trusted routes to the destination. The generic-single-
source-shortest-distance algorithm would unicast RREQ messages in order of trust to their 
neighbours.  By doing this, cyclic paths are avoided and the procedure of discovering the 
most trust path is maximised. The possibility of unicasting RREQ messages instead of 
broadcasting them is unfeasible for mobile ad hoc networks due to resource limitations.  
Instead DITD’s proposal of filtering the routes by sequence number and trust will effectively 
realizes the relaxation process of the Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm in a reactive rather 
than a proactive manner. 
The four additives to the trust path discovery phase allow for conduct trust evaluation to be 
added to the on-demand routing protocol of the ad hoc network increasing the security of 
trust chains created during indirect trust establishment.  The conduct model is explained 
with an example. 
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Fig. 9. Illustration of the filtering the most trusted route 
To summarise this section, we can say that the section showed how the proposed hybrid trust 
scheme is incorporated into an ad hoc on-demand routing scheme with a low level complexity. 
Direct and indirect trust is established by localized one-hope certificate exchanges in a reactive 
manner and conduct trust is appended by aggregating trust along paths. The following section 
discusses the performance of the proposed scheme with use of simulations. 
4. Performance and simulation study of the proposed DITD Model 
There are two main approaches to evaluate routing applications for mobile ad hoc networks: 
simulations and real test beds [Kiess & Mauve, 2007] [Ke et al, 2000].  Real test beds can 
provide realistic results. However, they are impractical to set up. A real test bed, for a large 
network of nodes would requires 50 nodes in operation which is considerably costly.  It is 
also difficult to compare different protocols because of the difficulty in repeating test 
conditions, such as mobility and erratic wireless connectivity.  Therefore, real test beds are 
logistical unfeasibly. Currently, simulations are widely used to compare proposed routing 
protocols.  Simulation packages like ns2 [http://,2007] and GloMoSim [Zeng et al, 1998] 
provide an environment to design and compare proposed and existing protocols. The 
majority of literature on this subject use ns2 as its enhanced functionality is suitable for 
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wireless scenarios.  The ns2 network simulator was selected to perform a simulation study 
for the DITD model.    
This section presents the effects of adding the security functionality, proposed by the DITD 
model, to the AODV routing protocol.  This functionality includes a certificate distribution 
mechanism and a trust evaluation mechanism. The environment investigated is a large 
mobile ad hoc network which uses an on-demand routing algorithm. 
We use subsection 4.1 to: describe the simulation environment, discuss the simulation 
scenario, and introduce the traffic and mobility models.  Subsection 4.2 describes the 
performance metrics used to analyze the simulated routing protocols.  The focus of this 
section is found in Subsection 4.3 where a comprehensive simulation study is presented. 
This is done by comparing the proposed DITD model with the AODV routing protocol.  
Results are presented in simple line graphs and discussed accordingly. 
4.1 Simulation setup 
The goal of the simulation experiments is to measure the proposed routing protocol’s 
performance to a changing network topology and network conditions. To measure this, 
protocols are simulated at varied mobility conditions.  A comprehensive simulation study is 
presented of the proposed security scheme for mobile ad hoc networks implemented on the 
network layer. A summary of the simulation set used in our study is given in Table-5. 
a. Simulation Scenario 
The network was set up with 50 wireless nodes allowing data communication to occur in a 
peer-to-peer manner.  Nodes are mobile in a rectangular space of 1500m x 300m and the 
simulation is run for 900 seconds.  A rectangular area is preferred to a square area as longer 
routes can be expected.  Nodes were configured to use the 802.11b standard communicating 
over wireless channels with a two-ray ground radio propagation model with a bandwidth 
of 2Mbps and a nominal transmission range of 250m. 
 
Simulation Scenario
Physical and MAC model IEEE 802.11b standard 
Nominal bit rate 2Mbps 
Transmission Range 250m 
Number of nodes 50 nodes 
Simulation duration 900 seconds 
Simulation area 1500m x 300m 
Traffic Model
Traffic type CBR 
Data packet size 64 byte 
Traffic rate 4 packets per second 
Traffic started 0 – 180 seconds 
Number of connections and sources 30 and 20 
Mobility Model
Model Random Waypoint 
Max speed 0.1 , 1, 5, 10, 20, 30 m/s 
Pause time 0 and 250 seconds 
Table 5. Simulation Setup for varied topology 
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b. Traffic Model 
Traffic was simulated using a constant bit rate (CBR) traffic generator which models UDP 
traffic.  TCP traffic was not used because it uses its own flow control mechanism which 
schedules data packets based on the network’s ability to carry them.  CBR traffic is more 
useful for a routing protocol analysis as it allows the routing protocol to manage the flow of 
traffic.  All traffic is started within the first 180 seconds of the simulation.  Simulations were 
performed with data packets sizes of 64, 256, 512 and 1024 bytes. At higher data packet sizes 
traffic congestion causes a few nodes to drop most of their received packets, this was 
observed from test simulation runs. A data packet size of 64 bytes was selected for the 
simulation analysis.  The focus of the simulation study is to compare the performance of 
routing protocols against changing topology and as no load balancing is employed in any 
simulated protocol, congestion is factored out by selecting a lower data packet size. The 
traffic analysis model is consistent with routing protocol analysis in [Broch, 1998].  
For topology analysis the traffic load is fixed with a rate of 4 packets per second. The 
maximum number of connections is set to 30 connections with a traffic model with 20 
sources. 
c. Mobility Model 
A modified “random waypoint” mobility model was used to prevent mobility concerns 
highlighted in [Navidi, 2004].  The modified random waypoint model improves upon the 
standard model by selecting a speed which is between 10% and 90% of the given maximum 
speed.  This addition provides a more balanced mobility and prevents extreme drops in 
speed during simulation. 
Changing network topology is simulated based on network participant speed. The 
maximum speed was varied from 0 to 30m/s with 6 different mobility patterns (0.1, 1, 5, 10, 
20 and 30m/s) for two different pause time scenarios, 0 and 250 seconds, representing a 
network with continuous motion and a partially stable network.   
4.2 Performance metric  
The following quantitative metrics are used to analyze the performance of the routing 
protocols in mobile ad hoc networks.  
a. Packet Delivery Ratio 
The packet delivery ratio (PDR) represents the percentage of data packets that are 
successfully received by their intended destination. This metric is also known as throughput 
and is considered a measurement of the effectiveness of a routing protocol.  The equation for 
PDR is:  鶏経迎ガ 噺 デ 系稽迎堅結潔津怠デ 系稽迎嫌結券建津怠 抜 などど 
where デ 系稽迎堅結潔津怠  and デ 系稽迎堅結潔津怠  are the number of CBR data packets received and sent 
respectively. 
b. Routing Overhead 
A routing protocol uses control packets to establish routes on which data packets are 
transmitted. Control packets are separate from data packets but share the same 
communication channel.  Due to the lack of channel capacity in mobile ad hoc networks a 
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large number of control packets can result in poor network performance.  Key management 
would require additional control packets to achieve key management functionality this will 
be reflected in the simulations.  The routing overhead is also known as a routing protocol’s 
internal efficiency and will represent the number of control packets used for a given 
protocol. 
c. Average End-to-End Delay 
This is a qualitative measurement of the delay of data packets. The average end-to-end 
delay of a data packet is the time from which it is created at the source and when it arrives 
at the intended destination.  The delay includes propagation and queuing delay.  Delay can 
be caused by a high number of control packets propagating in the network or a high 
computational overhead for the given protocol.  The average end-to-end delay is calculated 
as follows,  継券穴"建剣"継券穴"経結健欠検 噺 "デ 岫系稽迎嫌結券穴建件兼結 伐 系稽迎堅結潔懸建件兼結岻津怠 デ 系稽迎堅結潔津怠  
where CBRsendtime and CBRrecvtime represent the record times that a CBR data packet was 
sent and received. 
4.3 DITD simulation 
a. Implementation 
A linux based server was set up to run the Network Simulator ns-2.31 [http://,2007].  A 
routing protocol was designed in C++ based on the AODV routing protocol available in the 
ns-2.31 package. The routing protocol DITD is programmed as a routing agent class.  The 
routing agent handles the establishment of routes, certificate distribution and trust 
evaluation. Modifications are made to the AODV routing agent at the RecvRequest, 
SendRequest, RecvReply, and SendReply functions. These modifications allow for the 
distribution of separate certificate packets, triggered by the routing packets.  The routing 
agent’s packet header was modified to include a certificate control packet CertS.  The size of 
the certificate included is 450 bytes which correlates with experiments in [Zapata, 2006].  
The size of the certificate control packets is increased resulting in an effective delay in 
communication simulating the transfer of actual certificates.  The authors of [Awerbuch et 
al, 2008] use a similar approach to simulate the effect of security processing.  A certificate 
table is included at each node CertTable which is updated by certificate control packets.  The 
certificate table is linked to the routing table and each node is responsible for managing its 
own certificate table. 
The trust evaluation scheme assumes that monitoring trust evidence is available.  Routing 
control packets are modified to include an associated trust variable.  As each routing packet 
propagates through the network, the trust of the specific route is calculated and stored in the 
routing table of each node.  Implicit trust revocation and trust path selection is performed at 
RecvRequest and RecvReply functions respectively. 
A simulation tcl file is written to setup the mobile ad hoc network’s desired simulation 
scenario, traffic and mobility model.  The trace support files in ns-2.31 were modified to 
support the DITD routing agent allowing the inclusion of certificate control packets and 
trust information.  As a result the output trace and nam files reflect the operation of the 
DITD routing agent.  Figure 10 shows a sample output of the nam simulation file and Figure 
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11 shows a sample trace file output.  AWK, an extremely versatile programming language 
for unix based systems, was used to write script files to analyze the trace data and provide 
the measured performance metrics.  Finally unix based shell script files were written to 
allow for multiple iterations and simulation scenarios to be run simultaneously resulting in 
over 1000 simulation runs and 430 Gb of data analyzed and presented in simple line graphs.  
 
 
Fig. 10. Sample nam simulation file illustrating typical network topology 
 
 
Fig. 11. Sample trace file output for DITD simulation run 
b. DITD Performance Results 
The DITD model is compared with the AODV routing protocol.  Further comparisons are 
presented against a conventional approach to key distribution. The simulation scenario used 
is described in Section 2.4.2 which is used throughout the simulation study. The traffic 
model simulates a moderate traffic load at a rate of 4 packets per second. The effects of 
changing topology are investigated by varying the node speed for a continuously moving 
network and a partially stable network. The simulation results were averaged over 10 
speeds per scenario, resulting in a total of 360 iterations for the speed analysis. 
Packet delivery 
The packet delivery results for the AODV and DITD routing protocols are presented in 
Figure 12 and Figure 13.  Figure 12 represents a simulation environment with a pause time 
r 19.867 _9_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 60 [0 ffffffff 16 800] --- [22:255 -1:255 26 0] [0x2 5 1 [19 0] [17 
20]] 20 (REQUEST) 
r 19.867 _43_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 60 [0 ffffffff 16 800] --- [22:255 -1:255 26 0] [0x2 5 1 [19 0] [17 
20]] 20 (REQUEST) 
r 19.868 _25_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 508 [13a 19 27 800] --- [39:255 25:255 1 25] [0x14 [25 32] [39] 10 
[0 0] 4 0 1] (CERT_R) 
r 19.871 _13_ RTR  --- 125 cbr 84 [13a d 11 800] --- [17:3 19:0 30 13] [0] 1 3 
f 19.8711 _13_ RTR  --- 125 cbr 84 [13a d 11 800] --- [17:3 19:0 29 39] [0] 1 3 
r 19.8724 _26_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 508 [13a 1a 28 800] --- [40:255 26:255 1 26] [0x14 [26 28] [40] 10 
[0 0] 4 0 1] (CERT_R) 
r 19.8733 _39_ RTR  --- 125 cbr 84 [13a 27 d 800] ---[17:3 19:0 29 39] [0] 2 3 
f 19.8733 _39_ RTR  --- 125 cbr 84 [13a 27 d 800] --- [17:3 19:0 28 19] [0] 2 3 
r 19.877 _48_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 508 [13a 30 12 800] --- [18:255 48:255 1 48] [0x12 [48 30] [18] 
10.00 [18 17] 1] (CERT_S) 
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of 0 seconds.  This represents a network of nodes that are continually moving, while Figure 
13 represents a partially stable network.  The observation is made that as the speed increases 
both protocols throughput decreases.  At high speeds the network topology changes rapidly 
causing breakages in routing links.  The reduction in packet delivery at high speeds is 
because both protocols will drop data packets as a result of increased routing breakages.  
The curves for the AODV and DITD packet delivery ratio have similar shapes.  This is 
expected because the DITD model is based on the AODV model.  In Figure 12 the DITD 
model shows a 0–10% reduction gap in packet delivery when compared to the AODV 
model.  The gap increases uniformly as the speed increases leveling at 10% for speeds of 20 
m/s and higher.  Similarly for the more stable network, presented in Figure 13, there is a 
reduction in packet delivery ratio of 0-5% when compared to the AODV model.  The stable 
network in Figure 13 shows better performance at higher speeds because the number of 
route link breakages is reduced as a result of a larger pause time.  A large pause time 
represents a network that will move at a given speed then pause in a fixed location for a set 
amount of time. During this time routing link breakages are not expected until movement 
commences again. The reduction in packet delivery ratio of DITD, when compared to 
AODV, can be attributed to the additional certificate packets being distributed and handled 
by the routing agent. The packet queue for the routing protocol has a limited capacity and 
when it is overloaded, packets are dropped. This will cause a resultant drop in throughput. 
The DITD model optimizes its throughput by processing the routing and certificate control 
packets independently of each other. 
A certificate distribution scheme would expect a severe reduction in performance due to an 
excessive number of packets being transmitted in the network or the additional size of the 
control packet. A conventional certificate distribution scheme, suggested as a possible 
solution in [Buchegger & Boudec, 2002], simply includes the source certificate in the request 
packets RREQ and the destinations certificate in the reply packets RREP. This method was 
implemented as a separate routing agent AODVcert in ns2. A similar method is suggested in 
[Papadimitratos & Hass, 2002]. Implementation includes increasing the packet size of the 
 
 
Fig. 12. Packet Delivery Ratio for highly mobile network (0 second pause time) 
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Fig. 13. Packet Delivery Ratio for partially stable network (250 second pause time) 
routing control packets to include a 450 byte certificate. This effectively increased the 
regular 56 byte AODV route control packets to 506 bytes. Such an approach would result in 
the simplest method of certificate distribution but transmitting 450 bytes more data per 
control packet would severely reduce the network performance. 
The AODVcert routing agent was simulated under the same simulation conditions as AODV 
and DITD, and the packet delivery ratio is presented in Figure 30 and Figure 31. It can be 
observed that the packet delivery ratio is severely less than both the AODV and DITD 
model. For a pause time of 0 seconds, there is an average gap of 55% between AODVcert and 
AODV and an average gap of 49% between AODVcert and DITD. Similar results are 
observed for the stable network in Figure 31. This simulation shows that DITD optimizes the 
distribution of certificates by sending them as separate certificate control packets 
independent of the route control packets. The certificate control packets are processed 
independently of the routing packets, allowing concurrent processing in a fully distributive 
system. The operation of DITD allows for certificate distribution with minimal effect upon 
the routing procedure. 
During this time routing link breakages are not expected until movement commences again.  
The reduction in packet delivery ratio of DITD, when compared to AODV, can be attributed 
to the additional certificate packets being distributed and handled by the routing agent.  The 
packet queue for the routing protocol has a limited capacity and when it is overloaded 
packets are dropped.  This will cause resultant drop in throughput. The DITD model 
optimizes its throughput by processing the routing and certificate control packets 
independent of each other.  
A certificate distribution scheme would expect a severe reduction in performance due to an 
excessive number of packets being transmitted in the network or the additional size of 
control packet.  A conventional certificate distribution scheme, suggested as a possible 
solution in [Zapata, 2002], simply includes the source’s certificate in the request packets 
RREQ and includes the destination’s certificate in the reply packets RREP.  This method was 
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implemented as a separate routing agent AODVcert in ns2.  A similar method is suggested 
in [Sanzgiri et al, 2002].  Implementation includes increasing the packet size of the routing 
control packets to include a 450 byte certificate. This effectively increased the regular 56 byte 
AODV route control packets to 506 bytes. Such an approach would result in the simplest 
method of certificate distribution but the result of transmitting 450 bytes more data per 
control packet would severely reduce the network performance.  The AODVcert routing 
agent was simulated under the same simulation conditions as AODV and DITD and the 
packet delivery ratio is presented in Figure 12 and Figure 13.  It can be observed that the 
packet delivery ratio is severely less than  
Figure 14 shows that the DITD model has a 10% reduction in throughput for high speed 
mobile ad hoc networks.  A high speed network is described by a maximum node speed of 20 
and 30 m/s.  This simulates mobile units travelling at a maximum speed of 70–100km/h 
which is typical of mobile military vehicles.  Mobility aids the distribution of certificates as 
nodes come in close contact with each other and are able to establish direct trust relations 
reducing end-to-end certificate distribution.  These benefits are similar to Capkun’s solution 
which relies upon mobility to establish trust in a localized manner [Capkun et al, 2006].  
Capkun’s solution is aided by mobility but is also dependent upon mobility for trust relations 
to be established.  Because of this dependency, a period of weakened security is expected as 
nodes exchange certificates.  DITD does not only distribute certificates in a localized manner 
but Figure 30 shows that the DITD model has a 0 - 3% reduction in throughput for low speed 
mobile ad hoc networks where nodes move at a maximum speed of 0–10 m/s.  This type of 
networks is typical of infantry units or a nam the ground scenario.  DITD allows for mobility to 
aid the distribution of certificates but not relying upon mobility for throughput success. This 
allows DITD to operate successfully in slow moving and stationary type networks. The packet 
delivery ratio results show that DITD provides certificate distribution at a low performance 
cost for high speed networks and for low speed networks. 
Control Packet Overhead 
The control packet overhead presents a comparison between the AODV and DITD models.  
The overhead is presented in terms of the number control packets.  The AODV model will 
have only routing control packets while the DITD model will have both routing and certificate 
packets.  The results are presented in Figure 32 and Figure 15 for a highly mobile network with 
pause time of 0 seconds and a partially stable network with pause time of 250 seconds.  The 
DITD model aims to distribute certificates while routes are discovered and a resultant packet 
overhead is expect.  AODV and DITD are similar in shape and it is observed that the number 
of control packets increases as the speed increases.  As the speed increases the topology of the 
network changes more rapidly causing routing link breakages and forcing nodes requesting 
communication to re-establish routes by send new route request messages.  For a partially 
stable network presented in Figure 15 the effects of speed are reduced.  This confirms that a 
larger pause time provides a more stable network.  Figure 14 and Figure 15 show a consistent 
control packet overhead for the DITD model.  It is observed that the gradient of DITD’s packet 
overhead decreases as speed increases.  This is because mobility aids certificate distribution 
and as the speed increases less certificate control packets are required.  For example in Figure 
14 at the low speed of 1 m/s there is a 132% increase in the number packets when compared to 
the AODV protocol.  This overhead decreases for higher speeds showing a comparative 38% 
and 33% packet overhead for speeds of 20 m/s and 30 m/s respectively. This confirms that 
mobility aids certificate distribution. 
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A standard AODV request message is 48 bytes and a reply message is 44 bytes.  The DITD 
model uses request message of 60 bytes and reply messages of 56 bytes.  Therefore, DITD 
increases the routing control packet size by 12 bytes.  DITD’s routing control packets contain 
trust associated variables and flags to trigger back-tracked certificate distribution. The DITD 
certificate control packets are 508 bytes in size as they included a 450 byte certificate.  It is 
noted that making the routing and certificate control packets separate and independent 
from each other has a greater impact on reducing the per byte packet overhead.  This 
independency allows for concurrent processing of packets which is optimal in a fully 
distributive ad hoc network. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Control packet overhead for highly mobile network (0 second pause time) 
 
 
Fig.15. Control packet overhead for partially stable network (250 second pause time) 
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End-to-End Delay 
The average end-to-end delay results are presented in Figure 16 and Figure 17. It is observed 
that the DITD model delivers packets with more delay than AODV.  The additional delay is 
attributed to the transmission delay, the packet queuing delay, and the processing delay of 
additional certificate control packets. The processing delay includes verification. A 
conventional certificate distribution scheme that follows the route discovery process would 
require that certificates be verified before the routing packets are forwarded. DITD performs 
verifications independent of the routing procedure. The request route is established 
following the route request message RREQ to the destination and DITD performs 
verifications independently without hindering the propagation of the RREQ message.   
 
 
 
 
Fig. 16. Average end-to-end delay for highly mobile network (0 second pause time) 
DITD uses back-track verification to minimize the number of verifications performed on the 
reply route which follows the reply message RREP toward the source.  Hass and Pearlman 
[Haas & Pearlman, 2001] propose a solution which performs all verifications on the reply 
route. This method minimizes the nuns performed in a networks lifetime but results in 
delayed establishment of routes.  If ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) type keys are used the 
verification process could take up to 16 ms per verification [Zapata, 2006] such a delay is 
unrealistic for multi hop routes requiring verification. DITD’s approach attempts to 
minimize the delay incurred. 
c. Trust Evaluation Results 
In order to test the performance of the security evaluation scheme, a black hole attack was 
simulated to show that DITD’s security evaluation scheme excludes malicious nodes from 
trust and route establishment protecting the network from black hole type attacks. A black 
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hole adversary model was designed on the ns-2.31 link layer (LL) which lies below the 
routing layer.  Modifications were made to the link layer agent ll.cc to simulate a black hole 
attack. Each packet sent by the routing layer is checked at the link layer, the adversary 
model silently drops all data packets while still allowing routing packets to be passed. This 
creates the affect of a black hole attack. A second black hole adversary model was 
implemented which includes a rushing type attack. The rushing attack was implemented by 
allowing adversary nodes to forward routing packets immediately, removing the small jitter 
delay that AODV implements. AODV uses this small delay to reduce the number of 
collisions and ensure the shortest path is selected.  The rushing attack gives an adversary 
node a time advantage over normal nodes resulting in the adversary node becoming part of 
considerably more routes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 17. Average end-to-end delay for partially stable network (250 second pause time) 
The same simulation scenario and traffic model was used to analyse the black hole attack.  
The mobility was fixed with a pause time of 0 seconds and three speeds were investigated 
(0.1m/s, 5m/s and 20m/s). A 50 node network was simulated with 6 different attack 
scenarios.  The attack scenarios were created by varying the number of black hole adversary 
nodes added by 0 to10.  Figure 18 shows the nam simulation file for a simulation scenario 
with 10 adversary nodes. Each scenario was averaged over 10 seeds resulting in 720 
iterations for the security evaluation scheme analysis.  The black hole attack aims to drop 
data packets and reduce the networks throughput. The effects of a black hole and rushing 
attack are analysed using the packet delivery ratio performance metric. 
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Black hole adversary node 
Trusted node 
Fig. 18. Sample nam simulation of black hole network simulation 
Packet delivery 
A black hole type problem is implemented to simulate the success of DITD’s security 
evaluation scheme.  The scenario assumes weighted nodes carry a security metric which 
identifies fault detection or data transmission errors carried out by a monitoring system at 
each node.  An example of such a system is found in [Buchegger & Boudec, 2002].  The 
weighted nodes are used to establish a weighted trust graph where each edge or route 
carries a trust calculated by DITD’s security evaluation scheme.  The effects of the black hole 
attack upon AODV and DITD are compared in Figure 37 and Figure 38.  It is observed that 
as the number of adversary nodes increases the packet delivery ratio for the AODV model 
decreases.  The AODV model is vulnerable to black hole attacks and in the presence of 10 
adversary nodes the packet delivery ratio is below 65%. The reduction in throughput is 
expected as more data packets will be dropped by the presence of many adversary nodes.  
DITD avoids the adversary nodes by implicitly excluding these nodes during route 
establishment.  The success of the protocol at low speeds is presented in Figure 19 and it is 
observed that even in presence of 10 adversary nodes the packet delivery ratio is not less 
than 90%.  Figure 38 presents the success of the DITD model at a higher mobility of 20m/s.  
The DITD model prevents the severe effects of black hole attacks showing better results 
when 4 and greater than 4 adversary nodes are present. There is approximately a 10% 
decrease in packet delivery ratio when compared to the low mobility scenario in Figure 19.  
This reduction in packet delivery ratio is attributed to the increase in link breakages 
apparent at higher speeds and the overhead incurred from the certificate exchange protocol.  
The results of DITD in Figure 20 correlate to the packet delivery ratio at 20m/s in Figure 12. 
A rushing attack was included for the simulations presented in Figure 21 and Figure 22.  An 
adversary node equipped with a rushing type attack will participate in more routes 
maximising the effect of its attack.  Figure 21 and Figure 22 show that when adversary nodes 
employ a rushing attack the effects of the black hole attack are maximised. The packet 
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delivery ratio of the AODV protocol is dropped to 40% when 10 adversary nodes are 
present.  This is considerably less when compared to the 60-65% packet delivery ratio that 
AODV experiences under the same conditions with a standalone black hole attack.  The 
results of DITD under rushing attacks are unnoticeable when compared to DITD with no 
rushing attacks.  For low speeds, DITD provides a throughput rate of above 90% even in the 
presence of 10 adversary nodes. 
 
 
Figure 19: Packet Delivery Ratio for slow moving network under black hole attack 
DITD provides a security scheme that excludes malicious nodes from participating in 
trusted routes, therefore preventing black hole attacks and a number of other attacks 
targeting the network layer. The inclusion of this trust evaluation scheme allows the 
distribution of certificates to operate in the most trusted routing environment. 
 
 
Fig. 20. Packet Delivery Ratio for fast moving network under black hole attack 
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4.4 Design verification 
The DITD model, in relation to the design requirements stated in Section-2.3, will now be 
discussed.  These requirements are based on the environment and functionality.  The design 
requirements are briefly revisited throughout the discussion that follows. 
a. Environment 
The DITD model is required to operate on the network layer in an on-demand, fully 
distributive, self-organized manner. Implementation was performed on the network layer, 
which avoided multi-layer design problems.  The simulation environment is set-up with no 
TTP member. This is similar to the way in which a certificate authority and network nodes are 
responsible for their own routing and trust establishment.  The successful operation of DITD in 
the given environment is proven through simulation results, as presented in Section-6.   
DITD is self-organized in nature. However, it is noted that DITD assumes the nodes are able 
to create their own keying material prior to joining the network. Self-certificates provide a 
strong binding between a user’s key and a unique identity. The generation of keying 
material without the presence of a TTP is a complex problem. Solutions exist based on 
identity-based key generation [Shamir, 1984] [Weimerkirch & Westhoff, 2003]. The author 
suggests that further research in this area is carried out. 
 
 
Fig. 21. Packet Delivery Ratio for slow moving network under black hole rush attack 
b. Functionality 
Certificate distribution is a requirement of the DITD model.  DITD provides the distribution 
of keying material in the form of self-certificates. Local certificate exchanges are made 
between one-hop neighbors, which create direct trust relations.  These direct trust relations 
are chained together to share certificates across multi-hop channels.   
The DITD model assumes the existence of a weighted conduct value at each node.  This 
allows the initial direct trust relations to have meaning.  If this information is not available, 
direct trust relationship need to be established over a location-limited channel to ensure 
security, similar to infrared. Proximity based solutions are used in [Capkun et al, 2006] 
[Scannell et al, 2009]. DITD’s simulation model assumes the availability of conduct 
information. Certificates are observed in the trace table as they are successfully transmitted 
to their desired destinations. 
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A second design requirement is that DITD must minimize the network overhead.  The DITD 
model distributes certificates which use separate unicast certificate control packets. The 
certificates are triggered by the routing control packets.  In comparison to AODV, DITD has 
an approximate 38% increase in control packets for highly mobile, high speed networks.  
The routing control packet size is increased by 12 bytes to include trust information and 
certificate control packets are 508 bytes in size. These packets result in a serve control packet 
overhead. The effects upon performance are reduced by: independency; concurrent 
processing; and back-track verification.  Despite the significant control packet overhead, 
DITD merely reduces the packet delivery ratio by a 0-10% gap when compared to AODV.  
This reduction is notable if compared to a convention certificate distribution method, which 
increases the routing control packets by 450 bytes and results in over 50% reduction in 
packet delivery ratio. The performance of DITD is improved with more stable networks 
which have a higher pause time. 
Simulations show that as the speed of nodes increase, the network performance decrease, as 
a result of a rapidly changing topology and increased link breakages.  Simulations also show 
that mobility aids certificate distribution. However, DITD is not reliant on mobility and can 
still successfully operate in low speed and stationary type networks.  This allows DITD to 
meet the requirement to provide secure communication at the start of the network lifetime.  
Solutions in [Capkun et al, 2006] [Tanabe & Aida, 2007] depend on mobility to establish 
trust and expect an initial time delay before trust is established. DITD provides secure 
communication in a reactive manner without a significant time delay.  DITD is not limited 
by mobility, as it shows high throughput rates for low speed and stationary network 
environments. 
DITD is required to be robust in spite of changing topologies. The simulations presented in 
Section- 6 were performed under varied pause times and speeds. This helped the 
investigation of the performance of DITD under varying topology environments.  The 
simulation results show that DITD is robust in the presence of changing mobility, which will 
inherently have frequent routing failures. As mentioned above, DITD only reduces the 
throughput by a 0-10% gap across for changing topologies. It was observed that the DITD  
 
 
Fig. 22. Packet Delivery Ratio for fast moving network under black hole rush attack 
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model has an approximate 0.7 second end-to-end delay (0.4 seconds greater than AODV) for 
high speed, highly mobile networks. This indicates that DITD is not feasible to use for audio 
application, in highly mobile network environments.  DITD’s average end-to-end delay is 
reduced to 0.35 seconds (0.2 more than AODV) in a more stable network environment, 
which is within acceptable limits for audio application. 
The last functional requirement was the inclusion of trust evaluation scheme. The trust 
evaluation scheme allows for the most trusted route to be selected and for malicious nodes 
to be excluded from route participation. The success of the scheme is present in its 
prevention against black hole attacks. Simulations show that a black hole attack of 10 
adversary nodes causes a 35-40% reduction in packet delivery for the AODV routing 
protocol.  DITD avoids black hole and rushing attacks by excluding malicious nodes.  In low 
speed networks DITD achieves a 90-95% throughput rate in the presence of 10 adversary 
nodes. 
5. Contribution and future work 
5.1 Summary of contribution 
Mobile ad hoc networks allow for a new set of applications that benefit from the dynamic, 
autonomous, and spontaneous mobile nature, inherent to these networks. However, the 
very qualities that make these networks so attractive also provide designers with new 
security challenges. 
The focus of this work is upon trust establishment in mobile ad hoc network. This work 
contributes to the body of work in the following ways: 
‚ Background knowledge on mobile ad hoc networks is presented.  Their application in 
the military and commercial arena is investigated. A review of security attacks is 
present. Such attacks include: black hole attacks; wormhole attacks; eavesdropping 
attacks; byzantine attacks; resource consumption attacks; and routing table poisoning.  
The author identifies that mobile ad hoc networks are most vulnerable to network layer 
attacks and focus is placed on trust establishment on the network layer. 
‚ Providing a comprehensive survey on the existing key management solutions for 
mobile ad hoc networks.  The solutions are intended for different types of ad hoc 
networks and therefore their comparison is difficult.  The solutions that are investigated 
are: 
‚ Off-line Trusted Third Party Models 
‚ Partially Distributed Certificate Authority 
‚ Fully Distributed Certificate Authority 
‚ Cluster based Model 
‚ Proximity-based Identification 
‚ Self Issued Certificate Chaining 
A discussion of the functionality and characteristics of each approach is presented.  The 
self-issued certificate model is identified as providing the lowest level of pre-
configuration and off-line trusted third party (TTP) involvement. 
‚ A secure ad hoc routing survey.  This work is vital to understanding trust establishment 
on the network layer.  The following solutions are presented: 
‚ SEAD: Secure Efficient Ad Hoc Distance Vector Routing Protocol 
‚ Ariadne: A secure on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks 
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‚ ARAN: Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks 
‚ SAODV: Secure Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (SAODV) 
‚ SLSP: Secure Link-state routing 
‚ ODSBR: On-Demand Secure Routing Byzantine Resilient Routing Protocol 
‚ CONFIDANT: Reputation based solution 
A comparative summary is presented focusing upon the security analysis and 
operational requirements of each solution.  The Ariadne, ARAN, SAODV, OSRP and 
CONFIDANT are designed for on-demand ad hoc routing. All the protocols 
investigated, except the CONFIDANT protocol, assumption pre-existing key 
relationships or the presence of a key management system to perform the tasks of key 
distribution and maintenance. The CONFIDANT protocol avoids key management by 
establishing trust based solely on conduct. This part of the dissertation identifies an 
open research field in area of key management on the routing layer of mobile ad hoc 
networks. 
‚ Presenting a novel security solution for mobile ad hoc networks. The solution is called 
Direct Indirect Trust Distribution (DITD) and is designed for an on-demand, fully 
distributive, self-organized, mobile ad hoc network. The scheme provides key 
distribution in the form of separate unicast certificate exchanges.  The certificate 
exchange packets are independent from the routing control packets allow route 
establishment to operate concurrently but independently from trust establishment.  A 
trust evaluation scheme is proposed that allows conduct based trust to influence to 
selection of routes and implicitly exclude malicious attacking nodes.  This scheme 
allows the keying information to be distributed in a more secure manner. 
‚ A comprehensive simulation study compares the performance of DITD and AODV, the 
protocol on which DITD is based. Simulation results show that under changing 
topologies DITD provides successful certificate distribution and trust evaluation with a 
minimal throughput reduction of 0-10%.  Simulations show that DITD does not rely on 
mobility to distribute certificates and still performs in low speed communication 
networks. A black hole and rushing attack adversary model is designed on the link 
layer.  Simulations show that DITD is successful in excluding malicious nodes from 
participating in route and trust establishment. The work simulation results and the 
discussions show that the proposed model can be implemented with low complexity 
and provides the functionality of key distribution and security evaluation with trivial 
effects on the network performance. 
5.2 Future work 
Future development will be made to enhance the DITD protocol, to further minimise the 
performance overhead.  Future work includes the implementation of a load balancing agent 
to compliment and optimize the efficiency of DITD’s key management. 
The proposed model is not a standalone security solution. Future work includes the 
integration of the DITD scheme with a secure ad hoc routing protocol to realize a complete 
security system. 
The key management tasks are key distribution, key generation, key maintenance and key 
revocation [Menezes et al, 1996b].  The DITD model addresses key distribution assuming 
that keys are generated by participating nodes. The generation of a secure certificate binding 
between a node and its public key is difficult without the presence of a trusted third party.  
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Furthermore, the effects adversary nodes with multiple identities performing Sybil attacks is 
a problem that is difficult to solve. 
Trust evaluation schemes require that trust evidence be made available. Trust establishment 
is made up of the following services: gathering, generation, discovery and evaluation of 
trust evidence. This dissertation focuses upon the trust evaluation. Future work includes the 
gathering and interpreting of trust evidence by using local network monitors. 
Mobile ad hoc cluster based networks has found increasing application in the military 
sector.  Efficient and secure cluster based key management is a open research area to be 
investigated in the future. 
6. References 
[Abdul-Rahman, 1997]  A. Abdul-Rahman, "The PGP trust model," EDI-Forum: The Journal of 
Electronic Commerce, vol. 10, pp. 27-31, 1997. 
[Aram et al, 2003]  K. Aram, K. Jonathan, and A. A. William, "Toward Secure Key 
Distribution in Truly Ad-Hoc Networks," in Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on 
Applications and the Internet Workshops (SAINT'03 Workshops): IEEE Computer 
Society, 2003. 
[Awerbuch et al, 2002] B. Awerbuch, D. Holmer, C. Nita-Rotaru, and H. Rubens, "An on-
demand secure routing protocol resilient to byzantine failures," in Proceedings of the 
1st ACM workshop on Wireless security Atlanta, GA, USA: ACM, 2002. 
[Awerbuch et al, 2008 B. Awerbuch, R. Curtmola, D. Holmer, C. Nita-Rotaru, and H. 
Rubens, "ODSBR: An on-demand secure Byzantine resilient routing protocol for 
wireless ad hoc networks," ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 10, pp. 1-35, 2008. 
[Basagni et al, 2001] S. Basagni, K. Herrin, D. Bruschi, and E. Rosti, "Secure pebblenets," in 
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking 
\&amp; computing Long Beach, CA, USA: ACM, 2001. 
[Broch, 1998] J. Broch, D. A. Maltz, D. B. Johnson, Y.-C. Hu, and J. Jetcheva, "A performance 
comparison of multi-hop wireless ad hoc network routing protocols," in Proceedings 
of the 4th annual ACM/IEEE international conference on Mobile computing and 
networking Dallas, Texas, United States: ACM, 1998. 
[Bruce, 2003] S. Bruce, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World: 
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2003. 
[Buchegger & Boudec, 2002] S. Buchegger and J.-Y. L. Boudec, "Performance analysis of the 
CONFIDANT protocol," in Proceedings of the 3rd ACM international symposium on 
Mobile ad hoc networking \&amp; computing Lausanne, Switzerland: ACM, 2002. 
[Capkun et al., 2003] S. Capkun, L. Butty, and J.-P. Hubaux, "Self-Organized Public-Key 
Management for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," IEEE Transactions on Mobile 
Computing, vol. 2, pp. 52-64, 2003. 
[Capkun et al, 2006] S. Capkun, L. Buttyan, and J.-P. Hubaux, "Mobility Helps Peer-to-Peer 
Security," IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 5, pp. 43-51, 2006. 
[Chor et al, 1985]  B. Chor, S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and B. Awerbuch, "Verifiable secret 
sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults (extended abstract)," 
proc. 26th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, October, 21-23 
1985. 
561
li i il
i i
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design 562 
[Davis, 2004] C. R. Davis, "A localized trust management scheme for ad hoc networks. ," In: 
3rd International Conference on Networking (ICN’04), pp. 671–675, 2004. 
[Desmendt & Jajodia, 1997] Y. Desmedt and S. Jajodia, "Redistributing Secret Shares to New 
Access Structures and Its Applications," Department of Information and Software 
Engineering, School of Information Technology and Engineering, George Mason 
University, Technical ReportJuly 1997. 
[Douceur, 2002] J. R. Douceur, "The Sybil Attack," in Revised Papers from the First 
International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems: Springer-Verlag, 2002. 
[Eschenauer & Gligor, 2002] L. Eschenauer and V. D. Gligor, "A Key-Management Scheme 
for Distributed Sensor Networks," proc. 9th ACM Conf. on Computer and 
Communication Security (ACM CCS'02), November, 17-21 2002. 
[Frankel et al, 1997] Y. Frankel, P. Gemmell, D. MacKenzie, and M. Yung, "Optimal 
resilience proactive public key cryptosystems," proc. 38th Annual Symposium on 
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS '97), October, 19-22 1997. 
[Grandison, 2003]  T. Grandison, "Trust Management for Internet Applications," Imperial 
College London, 2003. 
[Haas & Pearlman, 2001] Haas Z.J. and M. R. Pearlman, "The performance of query control 
schemes for the zone routing protocol," IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 9, pp. 427-438, 
2001. 
[Hu et al, 2002] Hu Y.C., D. B. Johnson, and A. Perrig, "SEAD: Secure Efficient Distance 
Vector Routing for Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks," in Proceedings of the Fourth 
IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications: IEEE Computer 
Society, 2002. 
[Hu et al, 2003b] Hu Y.C., A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, "Packet leashes: a defense against 
wormhole attacks in wireless networks," in INFOCOM 2003. Twenty-Second Annual 
Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. IEEE. vol. 3, 2003, 
pp. 1976-1986 vol.3. 
[Hu et al, 2005] Hu Y.C., A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, "Ariadne: a secure on-demand 
routing protocol for ad hoc networks," Wirel. Netw., vol. 11, pp. 21-38, 2005. 
[http://2007] "The Network Simulator," ver 2.31, Available at http://isi.edu/nsnam/ns/, 2007. 
[Johnson et al, 2001] Johnson D.B., D. A. Maltz, and J. Broch, "DSR: The Dynamic Source 
Routing Protocol for Multi-Hop Wireless Ad Hoc Networks," in In Ad Hoc 
Networking, edited by Charles E. Perkins, Chapter 5, 2001, pp. 139-172. 
[Ke et al, 2000] Ke Q., I. David, D. Maltz, and D. B. Johnson, "Emulation of Multi-Hop 
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks," in in The 7th International Workshop on Mobile 
Multimedia Communications (MoMuC, 2000. 
[Kiess&Mauve, 2007] Kiess W. and M. Mauve, "A survey on real-world implementations of 
mobile ad-hoc networks," Ad Hoc Netw., vol. 5, pp. 324-339, 2007. 
[Kscischang et al, 2001]  Kschischang F.R., B. J. Frey, and H.-A. Loeliger, "Factor graphs and 
the sum-product algorithm," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 47, pp. 
498-519, 2001. 
[Menezes et al, 1996a] Menezes A., P. van Oorschot, and S. Vanstone, Handbook in Applied 
Cryptography: CRC Press, 1996. 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design
www.intechopen.com
Trust Establishment in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks:  
Direct Trust Distribution-Performance and Simulation 563 
[Menezes et al, 1996b] Menezes A.J., S. A. Vanstone, and P. C. V. Oorschot, Handbook of 
Applied Cryptography: CRC Press, Inc., 1996. 
[Mohri, 2002] Mohri M., "Semiring frameworks and algorithms for shortest-distance 
problems," J. Autom. Lang. Comb., vol. 7, pp. 321-350, 2002 
[Navidi, 2004] Navidi W., "Stationary Distributions for the Random Waypoint Mobility 
Model," IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, vol. 3, pp. 99-108, 2004. 
[Papadimitratos & Hass, 2002] Papadimitratos P. and Z. J. Haas, "Secure Routing for Mobile 
Ad Hoc Networks," in proc. SCS Communication Network and Distributed System 
Modeling and Simulation Conf. (CNDS'02), 2002. 
[Papadimitratos & Hass, 2003] Papadimitratos P. and Z. J. Haas, "Secure Link State Routing 
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," in Proceedings of the 2003 Symposium on Applications 
and the Internet Workshops (SAINT'03 Workshops): IEEE Computer Society, 2003. 
[Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994] Perkins C.E. and P. Bhagwat, "Highly dynamic Destination-
Sequenced Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) for mobile computers," SIGCOMM 
Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 24, pp. 234-244, 1994. 
[Perkins et al, 2003] Perkins C., E. Belding-Royer, and S. Das, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) Routing: RFC Editor, 2003. 
[Perrig et al, 2001]  Perrig A., R. Canetti, D. Song, and D. Tygar, "Efficient and Secure Source 
Authentication for Multicast,"  Network and Distributed System Security 
Symposium (NDSS'01), 2001. 
[Publications FIP, 2008] F. I. P. S. Publications, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)," National 
Institute of Standards and TechnologyOctober 2008. 
[Rivest, 1992] Rivest R., The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm: RFC Editor, 1992 
[Sanzgiri et al, 2002] Sanzgiri K., B. Dahill, B. N. Levine, C. Shields, and E. M. Belding-Royer, 
"A Secure Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks," in Proceedings of the 10th IEEE 
International Conference on Network Protocols: IEEE Computer Society, 2002. 
[Scannell et al, 2009] Scannell A., A. Varshavsky, A. LaMarca, and E. D. Lara, "Proximity-
based authentication of mobile devices," Int. J. Secur. Netw., vol. 4, pp. 4-16, 2009. 
[Shamir, 1984]  Shamir A., "Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes," in proc. 
Advances in Cryptology: Crypto'84, 1984. 
[Stalling, 2003] Stallings W., Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practices: 
Prentice Hall, 2003. 
[Stephan Eichler, 2006]  Stephan Eichler C.R., "Challenges of Secure Routing in MANETs: A 
Simulative Approach using AODV-SEC," in Mobile Adhoc and Sensor Systems 
(MASS), 2006 IEEE International Conference on, 2006. 
[Tanabe & Aida, 2007] Tanabe M. and M. Aida, "Secure communication method in mobile 
wireless networks," in Proceedings of the 1st international conference on MOBILe 
Wireless MiddleWARE, Operating Systems, and Applications Innsbruck, Austria: ICST 
(Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications 
Engineering), 2007. 
[Theodorakopoulos & Baras, 2006] Theodorakopoulos G. and J. S. Baras, "On Trust Models 
and Trust Evaluation Metrics for Ad-Hoc Networks," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas 
in Communications, vol. 24, pp. 318-328, 2006 2006. 
563
li i il
i i
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design 564 
[Tseng et al, 2003] Tseng C.Y., P. Balasubramanyam, C. Ko, R. Limprasittiporn, J. Rowe, and 
K. Levitt, "A specification-based intrusion detection system for AODV," in 
Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks Fairfax, 
Virginia: ACM, 2003. 
[Weimerkirch & Westhoff, 2003]  Weimerskirch A. and D. Westhoff, "Identity Certified 
Authentication for Ad-hoc Networks," in proc. 1st ACM workshop on Security of ad 
hoc and sensor networks, 2003. 
[Zapata, 2002] Zapata M.G., "Secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing," 
SIGMOBILE Mob. Comput. Commun. Rev., vol. 6, pp. 106-107, 2002. 
[Zapata, 2006] Zapata M.G., "Key management and delayed verification for ad hoc 
networks," J. High Speed Netw., vol. 15, pp. 93-109, 2006. 
[Zeng et al, 1998] Zeng X., R. Bagrodia, and M. Gerla, "GloMoSim: a Library for Parallel 
Simulation for Large-scale Wireless Networks," in proc. 12th Workshop on Parallel 
and Distributed Simulations (PADS '98), 1998. 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design
www.intechopen.com
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Protocol Design
Edited by Prof. Xin Wang
ISBN 978-953-307-402-3
Hard cover, 656 pages
Publisher InTech
Published online 30, January, 2011
Published in print edition January, 2011
InTech Europe
University Campus STeP Ri 
Slavka Krautzeka 83/A 
51000 Rijeka, Croatia 
Phone: +385 (51) 770 447 
Fax: +385 (51) 686 166
www.intechopen.com
InTech China
Unit 405, Office Block, Hotel Equatorial Shanghai 
No.65, Yan An Road (West), Shanghai, 200040, China 
Phone: +86-21-62489820 
Fax: +86-21-62489821
Being infrastructure-less and without central administration control, wireless ad-hoc networking is playing a
more and more important role in extending the coverage of traditional wireless infrastructure (cellular
networks, wireless LAN, etc). This book includes state-of-the-art techniques and solutions for wireless ad-hoc
networks. It focuses on the following topics in ad-hoc networks: quality-of-service and video communication,
routing protocol and cross-layer design. A few interesting problems about security and delay-tolerant networks
are also discussed. This book is targeted to provide network engineers and researchers with design guidelines
for large scale wireless ad hoc networks.
How to reference
In order to correctly reference this scholarly work, feel free to copy and paste the following:
Dawoud D.S., Richard L. Gordon, Ashraph Suliman and Kasmir Raja S.V. (2011). Trust Establishment in
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Direct Trust Distribution-Performance and Simulation, Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks:
Protocol Design, Prof. Xin Wang (Ed.), ISBN: 978-953-307-402-3, InTech, Available from:
http://www.intechopen.com/books/mobile-ad-hoc-networks-protocol-design/trust-establishment-in-mobile-ad-
hoc-networks-direct-trust-distribution-performance-and-simulation
© 2011 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike-3.0 License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction for
non-commercial purposes, provided the original is properly cited and
derivative works building on this content are distributed under the same
license.
